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Encyclopedia > Philosophy of Mind
A phrenological mapping of the brain. Phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain.
A phrenological mapping of the brain. Phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain.

Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body. The mind-body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as the central issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body.[1] Image File history File links Phrenology1. ... Image File history File links Phrenology1. ... Phrenology (from Greek: φρήν, phrēn, mind; and λόγος, logos, knowledge) is a theory which claims to be able to determine character, personality traits and criminality on the basis of the shape of the head (i. ... The human brain In animals, the brain (enkephale) (Greek for in the skull), is the control center of the central nervous system, responsible for behavior. ... For other uses, see Philosophy (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ... To meet Wikipedias quality standards, this article or section may require cleanup. ... Mental functions and cognitive processes are terms often used interchangeably (although not always correctly so, the term cognitive tends to have specific implications - see cognitive and cognitivism) to mean such functions or processes as perception, introspection, memory, imagination, conception, belief, reasoning, volition, and emotion--in other words, all the different... A mental property is a property of the mind. ... Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and ones environment. ...


Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind-body problem. Dualism is the position that mind and body are in some categorical way separate from each other. It can be traced back to Plato,[2] Aristotle[3][4][5] and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy,[6] but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century.[7] Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas Property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.[8] René Descartes illustration of dualism. ... For other uses, see Monist (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Plato (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Aristotle (disambiguation). ... Samkhya, also Sankhya, (Sanskrit: सांख्य) is a school of Indian philosophy, and is one of the six astika or Hindu philosophical schools of India. ... For other uses, see Yoga (disambiguation). ... Hinduism (known as in modern Indian languages)[1] is a religious tradition[2] that originated in the Indian subcontinent. ... Descartes redirects here. ... René Descartes illustration of dualism. ... Property dualism is a philosophy of mind, and a subbranch of emergent materialism. ... In philosophy, emergentism is the belief in emergence, particularly as it involves consciousness and the philosophy of mind, and as it contrasts with reductionism. ...


Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities. This view was first advocated in Western Philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th Century BC and was later espoused by the 17th Century rationalist Baruch Spinoza.[9] Physicalists argue that only the entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that the mind will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.[10] For other uses, see Monist (disambiguation). ... This article is about ontology in philosophy. ... Western philosophy is a modern claim that there is a line of related philosophical thinking, beginning in ancient Greece (Greek philosophy) and the ancient Near East (the Abrahamic religions), that continues to this day. ... Parmenides of Elea (Greek: , early 5th century BC) was an ancient Greek philosopher born in Elea, a Hellenic city on the southern coast of Italy. ... In epistemology and in its broadest sense, rationalism is any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification (Lacey 286). ... Baruch de Spinoza (‎, Portuguese: , Basque: , Latin: ) (November 24, 1632 – February 21, 1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. ... The term physicalism was coined by Otto Neurath, in a series of early 20th century essays on the subject, in which he wrote According to physicalism, the language of physics is the universal language of science and, consequently, any knowledge can be brought back to the statements on the physical... In philosophy, idealism is any theory positing the primacy of spirit, mind, or language over matter. ... Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that nature consists of one kind (hence monism) of primal stuff, which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or attributes. ... Behaviorism (also called learning perspective) is a philosophy of psychology based on the proposition that all things which organisms do — including acting, thinking and feeling—can and should be regarded as behaviors. ... Type physicalism (also known as Type Identity Theory, Type-Type theory or just Identity Theory) is the theory, in the philosophy of mind, which asserts that mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated. ... Anomalous Monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind-body relationship. ... Functionalism is a theory of the mind in contemporary philosophy, developed largely as an alternative to both the identity theory of mind and behaviorism. ...


Many modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.[10] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences.[11][12][13][14] Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position which challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states.[15][16][17] Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the brain is all there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[18][19] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues. However, they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.[20][21] This article or section includes a list of works cited or a list of external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks in-text citations. ... Computer science, or computing science, is the study of the theoretical foundations of information and computation and their implementation and application in computer systems. ... Evolutionary psychology (abbreviated EP) is a theoretical approach to psychology that attempts to explain mental and psychological traits—such as memory, perception, or language—as adaptations, i. ... Drawing of the cells in the chicken cerebellum by S. Ramón y Cajal Neuroscience is a field that is devoted to the scientific study of the nervous system. ... Drawing of the cells in the chicken cerebellum by S. Ramón y Cajal Neuroscience is a field that is devoted to the scientific study of the nervous system. ...

Contents

The mind-body problem

Main article: Mind-body dichotomy

The mind-body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship that exists between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes.[1] One of the aims of philosophers who work in this area is to explain how a supposedly non-material mind can influence a material body and vice-versa. René Descartes illustration of mind/body dualism. ... For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ...


Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states; ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move their body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain what they want. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties.[10] A related problem is to explain how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) can cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the correct manner. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of René Descartes.[7] Stimulation is the irritating action of various agents (stimuli) on muscles, nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which activity is evoked; especially, the nervous impulse produced by various agents on nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which the part connected with the nerve is thrown into a state... The human eye is the first element of a sensory system: in this case, vision, for the visual system. ... A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. ... This article is about cells in the nervous system. ... Theory of knowledge redirects here: for other uses, see theory of knowledge (disambiguation) According to Plato, knowledge is a subset of that which is both true and believed Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, methods, limitations, and validity of knowledge and belief. ... Descartes redirects here. ...


Dualist solutions to the mind-body problem

Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter. It begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[8] One of the earliest known formulations of mind-body dualism was expressed in the eastern Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy (c. 650 BCE), which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakrti (material substance).[6] Specifically, the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali presents an analytical approach to the nature of the mind. René Descartes illustration of dualism. ... For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ... This article is about matter in physics and chemistry. ... For other uses, see Phenomena (disambiguation). ... This article is about the physical universe. ... Samkhya, also Sankhya, (Sanskrit: सांख्य) is a school of Indian philosophy, and is one of the six astika or Hindu philosophical schools of India. ... For other uses, see Yoga (disambiguation). ... In Hinduism, Purusha (Sanskrit man, Cosmic Man, in Sutra literature also called man) is the self which pervades the universe. ... Prakrti or Prakriti (from Sanskrit language) is, according to samkhya philosophy, the basic matter of which the universe consists. ... This article is in need of attention. ... Patañjali, is the compiler of the Yoga Sutra, a major work containing aphorisms on the practical and philosophical wisdom regarding practice of Raja yoga. ...


In Western Philosophy, the earliest discussions of dualist ideas are in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Each of these maintained, but for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.[2][3] However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-extended, non-physical substance.[7] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness, and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind-body problem in the form in which it still exists today.[7] Western philosophy is a modern claim that there is a line of related philosophical thinking, beginning in ancient Greece (Greek philosophy) and the ancient Near East (the Abrahamic religions), that continues to this day. ... For other uses, see Plato (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Aristotle (disambiguation). ... Descartes redirects here. ... Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and ones environment. ... It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with Self-consciousness. ...


Arguments for dualism

The main argument in favor of dualism is that it seems to appeal to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-philosophically-trained people. If asked what the mind is, the average person will usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They will almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible.[8] The majority of modern philosophers of mind think that these intuitions, like many others, are probably misleading and that we should use our critical faculties, along with empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions and determine if there is any real basis to them.[8] The self is a key construct in several schools of psychology. ... For other uses, see Soul (disambiguation). ... This article is about ontology in philosophy. ...


Another important argument in favor of dualism is the idea that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different, and perhaps irreconcilable, properties.[22] Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events do not. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the hippocampus feels like. Glutamate is the anion of glutamic acid. ... For other uses, see Hippocampus (disambiguation). ...


Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia (or raw feels).[22] There is something that it is like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[23] Redness is the canonical quale. ...


Interactionist dualism

Portrait of René Descartes by Frans Hals (1648)

Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.[7] In the 20th century, its major defenders have been Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles.[24] It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.[8] René Descartes, painting by Frans Hals, ca. ... René Descartes, painting by Frans Hals, ca. ... Descartes redirects here. ... Frans Hals (c. ... Sir Karl Raimund Popper CH FRS FBA (July 28, 1902 â€“ September 17, 1994) was an Austrian and British[1] philosopher and a professor at the London School of Economics. ... Sir John Carew Eccles (January 27, 1903 – May 2, 1997) was an Australian neurophysiologist who won the 1963 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on the synapse. ...


Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Seth has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing which has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on). He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties.[7]


At the same time, however, it is clear that Seth's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have causal effects on his body and vice-versa: A child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes him yell (physical event), this in turn provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the mother (mental event), and so on. Causality or causation denotes the relationship between one event (called cause) and another event (called effect) which is the consequence (result) of the first. ...


Descartes' argument crucially depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this.[25][26][27] For example, Joseph Agassi believes that several scientific discoveries made since the early 20th century have undermined the idea of privileged access to one's own ideas. Freud has shown that a psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than she does. Duhem has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than he does, while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than he does. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument, because scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than he can.[28] Joseph Agassi, born in Jerusalem on May 7, 1927, is an Israeli academic with contributions in logic, scientific method, and philosophy. ... (19th century - 20th century - 21st century - more centuries) Decades: 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s As a means of recording the passage of time, the 20th century was that century which lasted from 1901–2000 in the sense of the Gregorian calendar (1900–1999... Sigmund Freud (IPA: ), born Sigismund Schlomo Freud (May 6, 1856 – September 23, 1939), was an Austrian neurologist and psychiatrist who founded the psychoanalytic school of psychology. ... Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (10 June 1861 – 14 September 1916) French physicist and philosopher of science. ... For the Olympic champion athlete see Bronislaw Malinowski (athlete). ...


Other forms of dualism

Three varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Property dualism is not shown.
Three varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Property dualism is not shown.

1) Psycho-physical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another. Instead, they run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.[29] This view was most prominently defended by Gottfried Leibniz. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the monad, exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.[30] Image File history File links Dualism. ... Image File history File links Dualism. ... Parallelism may refer to: Parallelism (philosophy) - in the philosophy of mind a theistic, dualist solution to the mind-body problem Parallelism in computing Parallelism in grammar or in rhetoric This is a disambiguation page: a list of articles associated with the same title. ... Leibniz redirects here. ... Look up monad in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... Gottfried Leibnizs theory of pre-established harmony is a philosophical theory about causation under which every substance only affects itself, but all the substances (both bodies and minds) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other because they have been programmed by God in advance to...

Portrait of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz by Bernhard Christoph Francke (circa 1700)
Portrait of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz by Bernhard Christoph Francke (circa 1700)

2) Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche which asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental events, are not really causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.[31] Image File history File links Gottfried_Wilhelm_von_Leibniz. ... Image File history File links Gottfried_Wilhelm_von_Leibniz. ... Gottfried Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (July 1, 1646 in Leipzig - November 14, 1716 in Hannover) was a German philosopher, scientist, mathematician, diplomat, librarian, and lawyer of Sorb descent. ... Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that neither matter nor mind can be a true cause of events. ... Nicolas Malebranche (August 6, 1638 – October 13, 1715) was a French philosopher of the Cartesian school. ...


3) Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley.[32] It consists in the view that mental phenomena are causally ineffectual. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.[29] This view has been defended most strongly in recent times by Frank Jackson.[33] Epiphenomenalism is a view in philosophy of mind according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world. ... Thomas Henry Huxley PC, FRS (4 May 1825 Ealing – 29 June 1895 Eastbourne, Sussex) was an English biologist, known as Darwins Bulldog for his advocacy of Charles Darwins theory of evolution. ... Frank Cameron Jackson (born 1943) is a professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. ...


4) Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.[8] These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. This position is espoused by David Chalmers and has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years.[34] Property dualism is a philosophy of mind, and a subbranch of emergent materialism. ... Emergent materialism asserts that we will never understand the mechanism of emergence: it will always seem to us like emergence is magical. ... David John Chalmers (born April 20, 1966) is a philosopher in the area of philosophy of mind. ...


Monist solutions to the mind-body problem

In contrast to dualism, monism states that there are no fundamental divisions. Today, the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalist.[10] Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.[35] However, a variety of formulations (see below) are possible. Another form of monism, idealism, states that the only existing substance is mental. Although pure idealism, such as that of George Berkeley, is uncommon in contemporary Western philosophy, a more sophisticated variant called panpsychism, according to which mental experience and properties may be at the foundation of physical experience and properties, has been espoused by some philosophers such as William Seager.[36] Spinoza The two-dimensional work of art depicted in this image is in the public domain in the United States and in those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 100 years. ... Spinoza The two-dimensional work of art depicted in this image is in the public domain in the United States and in those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 100 years. ... Baruch de Spinoza (‎, Portuguese: , Basque: , Latin: ) (November 24, 1632 – February 21, 1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. ... This article does not cite any references or sources. ... For other uses, see Monist (disambiguation). ... The term physicalism was coined by Otto Neurath, in a series of early 20th century essays on the subject, in which he wrote According to physicalism, the language of physics is the universal language of science and, consequently, any knowledge can be brought back to the statements on the physical... This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedias quality standards. ... For the second husband of Henrietta Howard, Countess of Suffolk, see George Berkeley (MP). ... Panpsychism, in philosophy, is either the view that all parts of matter involve mind, or the more holistic view that the whole universe is an organism that possesses a mind. ...


Phenomenalism is the theory that representations (or sense data) of external objects are all that exist. Such a view was briefly adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century.[37] A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance which is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would then both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza[9] and was popularized by Ernst Mach[38] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism. In epistemology and the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (e. ... The concept of sense data (singular: sense datum) is very influential and widely used in the philosophy of perception. ... Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970), was a British philosopher, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, and pacifist. ... Logical positivism (later referred to as logical empiricism) holds that philosophy should aspire to the same sort of rigor as science. ... Baruch de Spinoza (‎, Portuguese: , Basque: , Latin: ) (November 24, 1632 – February 21, 1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. ... Ernst Mach Ernst Mach (February 18, 1838 – February 19, 1916) was an Austrian-Czech physicist and philosopher and is the namesake for the Mach number and the optical illusion known as Mach bands. ... Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that nature consists of one kind (hence monism) of primal stuff, which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or attributes. ...


Physicalistic Monisms

Behaviorism

Main article: Behaviorism

Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.[10] In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of introspectionism.[35] Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and can not be used to form predictive generalizations. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, psychology cannot be scientific.[35] The way out, therefore, was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.[39] Behaviorism (also called learning perspective) is a philosophy of psychology based on the proposition that all things which organisms do — including acting, thinking and feeling—can and should be regarded as behaviors. ... This article is about the psychological process of introspecting. ...


Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.[35] This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. For the behaviorist, mental states are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports. They are just descriptions of behavior or dispositions to behave in certain ways, made by third parties to explain and predict others' behavior.[40] In philosophy, epistemic theories of truth are attempts to analyse the notion of truth in terms of epistemic notions such as belief, acceptance, verification, justification, perspective and so on. ... In philosophy, physiology, and psychology, a disposition is a habit, a preparation, a state of readiness, or a tendency to act in a specified way. ...


Philosophical behaviorism, notably held by Wittgenstein, has fallen out of favor since the latter half of the 20th century, coinciding with the rise of cognitivism.[1] Cognitivists reject behaviorism due to several perceived problems. For example, behaviorism could be said to be counter-intuitive when it maintains that someone is talking about behavior in the event that a person is experiencing a painful headache. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), pictured here in 1930, made influential contributions to Logic and the philosophy of language, critically examining the task of conventional philosophy and its relation to the nature of language. ... The word cognitivism is used in several ways: In ethics, cognitivism is the philosophical view that ethical sentences express propositions, and hence are capable of being true or false. ... Something is counter-intuitive if it does not seem likely to be true using the tool of human intuition or gut-feeling to perceive reality. ...


Identity theory

Main article: Type physicalism

Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by John Smart[17] and Ullin Place[41] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavior, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".[17] Type physicalism (also known as Type Identity Theory, Type-Type theory or just Identity Theory) is the theory, in the philosophy of mind, which asserts that mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated. ... John Jameison Carswell Smart, or Jack Smart, (born 1920, M.A. (Glasgow, 1946), B.Phil (Oxford, 1948)) is a Scottish-Australian philosopher. ... Ullin Place (1924 – 2000) was a British philosopher and psychologist. ...

The classic Identity theory and Anomalous Monism in contrast. For the Identity theory, every token instantiation of a single mental type corresponds (as indicated by the arrows) to a physical token of a single physical type. For anomalous monism, the token-token correspondences can fall outside of the type-type correspondences. The result is token identity.
The classic Identity theory and Anomalous Monism in contrast. For the Identity theory, every token instantiation of a single mental type corresponds (as indicated by the arrows) to a physical token of a single physical type. For anomalous monism, the token-token correspondences can fall outside of the type-type correspondences. The result is token identity.

Despite its initial plausibility, the identity theory faces a strong challenge in the form of the thesis of multiple realizability, first formulated by Hilary Putnam.[19] It is obvious that not only humans, but many different species of animal can, for example, experience pain. However, it seems highly unlikely that all of these diverse organisms with the same pain experience are in the same identical brain state. And if the latter is the case, then pain cannot be identical to a specific brain state. The identity theory is thus empirically unfounded.[19] Image File history File links Anomalous_Monism. ... Image File history File links Anomalous_Monism. ... Multiple realizability, in philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental kind (property, state, event) can be realized by different physical kinds (properties, states or events). ... Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born July 31, 1926) is an American philosopher who has been a central figure in Western philosophy since the 1960s, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. ...


On the other hand, even granted all above, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one "mental" state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental states and types of brain state. The type-token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r, e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.[42] Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.[43] Despite these problems, there is a renewed interest in the type identity theory today, primarily due to the influence of Jaegwon Kim.[17] Jaegwon Kim (1934- ) is an American philosopher who explores the limitations of theories of strict psychophysical identity. ...


Functionalism

Functionalism was formulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.[19] Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind.[44] At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism which analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.[45] Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman. Another one, psychofunctionalism, is an approach adopted by naturalistic Philosophy of Mind associated with Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn. Functionalism is a theory of the mind in contemporary philosophy, developed largely as an alternative to both the identity theory of mind and behaviorism. ... Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born July 31, 1926) is an American philosopher who has been a central figure in Western philosophy since the 1960s, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. ... Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is a philosopher at Rutgers University, New Jersey. ... The computational theory of mind is the view that the human mind is best conceived as an information processing system very similar to or identical with a digital computer. ... David Malet Armstrong, often D. M. Armstrong, (1926 - ) is an Australian philosopher of mind, and scientific metaphysician. ... For other persons named David Lewis, see David Lewis (disambiguation). ... Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (IPA: ) (April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria – April 29, 1951 in Cambridge, England) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several ground-breaking ideas to philosophy, primarily in the foundations of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. ... Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (May 20, 1912 - July 2, 1989) was an American philosopher. ... Gilbert Harman (born 1938) is a contemporary philosopher teaching at Princeton University who has published widely in Ethics, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and the philosophies of Language and Mind. ... Functionalism is a theory of the mind in contemporary philosophy, developed largely as an alternative to both the identity theory of mind and behaviorism. ... This article is about methodological naturalism. ... Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is a philosopher at Rutgers University, New Jersey. ... Zenon Pylyshyn (born 1937) is a Canadian cognitive scientist and philosopher. ...


What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism abstracts away from the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.[44]


Nonreductive physicalism

Main article: Anomalous Monism

Many philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind-body relations: 1) Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states, but 2) All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.[35] Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism[18] is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism. Anomalous Monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind-body relationship. ... Donald Davidson (March 6, 1917 – August 30, 2003) was an American philosopher and the Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. ... Anomalous Monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind-body relationship. ...


A basic idea which all non-reductive physicalists share in common is the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical.[46] In philosophy, supervenience is a well-defined dependency relation between higher-level (. mental) and lower-level (. physical) properties. ...


Eliminative materialism

If one is a materialist but believes that not all aspects of our common sense psychology will find reduction to a mature cognitive-neuroscience, and that a non-reductive materialism is mistaken, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism. Eliminativists argue that our modern belief in the existence of mental phenomena is analogous to our ancient belief in obsolete theories such as the geocentric model of the universe. ...


There are several varieties of eliminative materialism, but all maintain that our common-sense "folk psychology" badly misrepresents the nature of some aspect of cognition. Eliminativists regard folk psychology as a falsifiable theory, and one likely to be falsified by future cognitive-neuroscientific research. Should better theories of the mental come along they argue, we might need to discard certain basic common-sense mental notions that we have always taken for granted, such as belief, consciousness, emotion, qualia, or propositional attitudes. This article does not cite any references or sources. ... For other uses, see Believe. ... Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and ones environment. ... Look up Emotion in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... Redness is the canonical quale. ... A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. ...


Eliminativists such as Patricia and Paul Churchland argue that while folk psychology treats cognition as fundamentally sentence-like, the non-linguistic vector/matrix model of neural network theory or connectionism will prove to be a much more accurate account of how the brain works.[15] Patricia Smith Churchland (born July 16, 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada) is a Canadian-American philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) since 1984. ... Paul Churchland (born 1942) is a philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego. ... Connectionism is an approach in the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. ...


The Churchlands often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and ontologies which have arisen in the course of history.[15][16] For example, Ptolemaic astronomy served to explain and roughly predict the motions of the planets for centuries, but eventually this model of the solar system was eliminated in favor of the Copernican model. The Churchlands believe the same eliminative fate awaits the "sentence-cruncher" model of the mind in which thought and behavior are the result of manipulating sentence-like states called "propositional attitudes." This article is about ontology in philosophy. ... A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. ...


Linguistic criticism of the mind-body problem

Each attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.[47] These philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers in the tradition of linguistic criticism, therefore reject the problem as illusory.[48] They argue that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that human experience can be described in different ways - for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.[48] This is the case, for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a sort of fallacy of reasoning.[48] Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (IPA: ) (April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria – April 29, 1951 in Cambridge, England) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several ground-breaking ideas to philosophy, primarily in the foundations of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. ... A category mistake is a semantic or ontological error by which a property (or some category of being) is incorrectly ascribed to a particular ontological type or token in a proposition and therefore is meaningless or nonsense. ...


Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker.[47] However, Hilary Putnam, the inventor of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind-body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.[49] Peter M.S. Hacker (born 15 July 1939 in London) is a British philosopher. ... Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born July 31, 1926) is an American philosopher who has been a central figure in Western philosophy since the 1960s, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. ...


Naturalism and its problems

The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the problem that the mind has certain properties that no other material thing seems to possess. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can nonetheless emerge from a material thing. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental."[35] Some of the crucial problems that this project attempts to resolve include the existence of qualia and the nature of intentionality.[35] This article is about methodological naturalism. ...


Qualia

Main article: Qualia

Many mental states have the property of being experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.[23] For example, it is characteristic of the mental state of pain that it hurts. Moreover, your sensation of pain may not be identical to mine, since we have no way of measuring how much something hurts nor of describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Philosophers and scientists ask where these experiences come from. Nothing indicates that a neural or functional state can be accompanied by such a pain experience. Often the point is formulated as follows: the existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. The puzzle of why many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness seems impossible to explain.[22] Redness is the canonical quale. ...


Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.[35] This follows from the logic of reductive explanations. If I try to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), I also have to explain why the phenomenon has all of the properties that it has (e.g., fluidity, transparency).[35] In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way. Viscosity is a measure of the resistance of a fluid to deformation under shear stress. ... See: transparency (optics) alpha compositing GIF#Transparency transparency (overhead projector) market transparency transparency (telecommunication) transparency (computing) For X11 pseudo-transparency, see pseudo-transparency. ...


The problem of explaining the introspective, first-person aspects of mental states, and consciousness in general, in terms of third-person quantitative neuroscience is called the explanatory gap.[50] There are several different views of the nature of this gap among contemporary philosophers of mind. David Chalmers and the early Frank Jackson interpret the gap as ontological in nature; that is, they maintain that qualia can never be explained by science because physicalism is false. There are two separate categories involved and one cannot be reduced to the other.[51] An alternative view is taken by philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn. According to them, the gap is epistemological in nature. For Nagel, science is not yet able to explain subjective experience because it has not yet arrived at the level or kind of knowledge that is required. We are not even able to formulate the problem coherently.[23] For McGinn, on other hand, the problem is one of permanent and inherent biological limitations. We are not able to resolve the explanatory gap because the realm of subjective experiences is cognitively closed to us in the same manner that quantum physics is cognitively closed to elephants.[52] Other philosophers liquidate the gap as purely a semantic problem. The basic idea of the explanatory gap is that human experience (such as qualia) cannot be fully explained by mechanical processes; that something extra, perhaps even of a different metaphysical type, must be added to fill the gap. The Explanatory Gap has vexed and intrigued philosophers and AI researchers alike... David John Chalmers (born April 20, 1966) is a philosopher in the area of philosophy of mind. ... Frank Cameron Jackson is a professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. ... This article is about ontology in philosophy. ... Thomas Nagel (born July 4, 1937, in Belgrade, Serbia) is University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University and member of the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. ... Colin McGinn (born 1950) is a British philosopher currently working at the University of Miami. ... Theory of knowledge redirects here: for other uses, see theory of knowledge (disambiguation) According to Plato, knowledge is a subset of that which is both true and believed Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, methods, limitations, and validity of knowledge and belief. ...


Intentionality

Main article: Intentionality
John Searle - one of the most influential philosophers of mind, proponent of biological naturalism (Berkeley 2002)
John Searle - one of the most influential philosophers of mind, proponent of biological naturalism (Berkeley 2002)

Intentionality is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.[21] This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.[53] It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[20] Intentionality, originally a concept from scholastic philosophy, was reintroduced in contemporary philosophy by the philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano in his work Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte. ... Philosopher John Searle, taken at a talk at UC Berkeley in spring 2002 by User:Fastfission. ... Philosopher John Searle, taken at a talk at UC Berkeley in spring 2002 by User:Fastfission. ... John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and is noted for contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and consciousness, on the characteristics of socially constructed versus physical realities, and on practical reason. ... Biological Naturalism states that consciousness is a higher level function of the human brains physical capabilities. ... Intentionality, originally a concept from scholastic philosophy, was reintroduced in contemporary philosophy by the philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano in his work Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte. ... The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject matter. ... Herodotus of Halicarnassus (Greek: Hērodotos Halikarnāsseus) was a Greek historian from Ionia who lived in the 5th century BC (ca. ...


Philosophy of mind and science

Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are not independent of bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.[1] There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, and psychology.[54] For the song by Girls Aloud see Biology (song) Biology studies the variety of life (clockwise from top-left) E. coli, tree fern, gazelle, Goliath beetle Biology (from Greek: βίος, bio, life; and λόγος, logos, speech lit. ... Computer science, or computing science, is the study of the theoretical foundations of information and computation and their implementation and application in computer systems. ... Cognitive science is usually defined as the scientific study either of mind or of intelligence (e. ... For other uses, see Cybernetics (disambiguation). ... For the journal, see Linguistics (journal). ... For the chemical substances known as medicines, see medication. ... Pharmacology (in Greek: pharmakon (φάρμακον) meaning drug, and lego (λέγω) to tell (about)) is the study of how drugs interact with living organisms to produce a change in function. ... Psychological science redirects here. ...


Neurobiology

Main article: Neurobiology

The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.[55] The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."[54] Neurobiology is the study of cells of the nervous system and the organization of these cells into functional circuits that process information and mediate behavior. ... The Michelson–Morley experiment was used to disprove that light propagated through a luminiferous aether. ...


Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines which are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:[55] Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation.[56] Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.[56] Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.[56] Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.[54] Neurobiology is the study of cells of the nervous system and the organization of these cells into functional circuits that process information and mediate behavior. ... Neurophysiology is a part of physiology as a science, which is concerned with the study of the nervous system. ... In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. ... Stimulation is the irritating action of various agents (stimuli) on muscles, nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which activity is evoked; especially, the nervous impulse produced by various agents on nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which the part connected with the nerve is thrown into a state... The field of cognitive neuroscience concerns the scientific study of the neural mechanisms underlying cognition and is a branch of neuroscience. ... Neuropsychology is a branch of psychology and neurology that aims to understand how the structure and function of the brain relate to specific psychological processes and overt behaviors. ... This article or section does not cite any references or sources. ... Ontogeny (also ontogenesis or morphogenesis) describes the origin and the development of an organism from the fertilized egg to its mature form. ... A phylogeny (or phylogenesis) is the origin and evolution of a set of organisms, usually of a species. ...

Since the 1980s, sophisticated neuroimaging procedures, such as fMRI (above), have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on ancient philosophical problems.
Since the 1980s, sophisticated neuroimaging procedures, such as fMRI (above), have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on ancient philosophical problems.

The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: neural correlate).[55] Several groups are inspired by these advances. New approaches to this question are being pursued by Steven Ericsson-Zenith at the Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering, where they propose a new mechanics for devices called machines that experience, designed to implement sentience and the fundament mechanisms of motility and recognition. Jeff Hawkins has established the Redwood Center for Theoretical Neuroscience at Berkeley, where they explore biomimicry for recognition algorithms. Sample fMRI data This example of fMRI data shows regions of activation including primary visual cortex (V1, BA17), extrastriate visual cortex and lateral geniculate body in a comparison between a task involving a complex moving visual stimulus and rest condition (viewing a black screen). ... Sample fMRI data This example of fMRI data shows regions of activation including primary visual cortex (V1, BA17), extrastriate visual cortex and lateral geniculate body in a comparison between a task involving a complex moving visual stimulus and rest condition (viewing a black screen). ... It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with functional neuroimaging. ... Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or fMRI) describes the use of MRI to measure hemodynamic signals related to neural activity in the brain or spinal cord of humans or other animals. ... Meethodology is defined as the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline, the systematic study of methods that are, can be, or have been applied within a discipline or a particular procedure or set of procedures [1]. It should be noted that methodology is... It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with functional neuroimaging. ... The concept of a neural correlate of a mental state is an important concept for materialists, those philosophers who believe that all mental states are equivalent to brain states. ... Steven Ericsson-Zenith is a computer scientist. ... The stated objective of the Institute for Advanced Science and Engineering is the explanation of experience in nature. ... Jeff Hawkins (born June 1, 1957 in Huntington, New York) is the founder of Palm Computing (where he invented the Palm Pilot) [1] and Handspring (where he invented the Treo). ...


Computer science

Main article: Computer science

Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers.[57] From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs which permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence. Computer science, or computing science, is the study of the theoretical foundations of information and computation and their implementation and application in computer systems. ... The ASCII codes for the word Wikipedia represented in binary, the numeral system most commonly used for encoding computer information. ... This article is about the machine. ... In computing, a programmer is someone who does computer programming and develops computer software. ... AI redirects here. ...


Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.[58] The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing test.[59] Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room which contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out to be indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind - intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle.[58] John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and is noted for contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and consciousness, on the characteristics of socially constructed versus physical realities, and on practical reason. ... The philosophy of artificial intelligence concerns questions of artificial intelligence (AI) such as: What is intelligence? How can one recognize its presence and applications? Is it possible for machines to exhibit intelligence? Does the presence of human-like intelligence imply consciousness and emotions? Is creating human-like artificial intelligence moral... Alan Mathison Turing, OBE, FRS (23 June 1912 – 7 June 1954) was an English mathematician, logician, and cryptographer. ... For the Doctor Who novel named after the test, see The Turing Test (novel). ... This article or section does not cite its references or sources. ... In philosophy, physics, and other fields, a thought experiment (from the German Gedankenexperiment) is an attempt to solve a problem using the power of human imagination. ...


The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).[60] Redness is the canonical quale. ... Wetware, also known as liveware or meatware, is a term generally used to refer to a person operating a computer. ...


Psychology

Main article: Psychology

Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.[61] Psychological science redirects here. ... Look up joy in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... For other uses, see Fear (disambiguation). ... OCD redirects here. ... Input3 is the term denoting either an entrance or changes which are inserted into a system and which activate/modify a process. ... Output is the term denoting either an exit or changes which exits a system and which activate/modify a process. ...


An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.[54] This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind-body problem already described. In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. ...


Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition

Most of the discussion in this article has focused on the predominant school (or style) of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes described as Anglo-American philosophy).[62] Other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy.[62] In any case, the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) tend to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis and more on directly understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some direct sense that does not involve the analysis of linguistic forms.[62] Analytic philosophy (sometimes, analytical philosophy) is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. ... Analytic philosophy is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to prominence during the 20th Century. ... Continental philosophy is a term used in philosophy to designate one of two major traditions of modern Western philosophy. ... This article is about the philosophical movement. ... Existentialism is the philosophical movement positing that individual human beings create the meaning and essence of their lives as persons. ... Personification of thought (Greek Εννοια) in Celsus Library in Ephesos, Turkey Thought or thinking is a mental process which allows beings to model the world, and so to deal with it effectively according to their goals, plans, ends and desires. ... Look up Experience in Wiktionary, the free dictionary This article discusses the general concept of experience. ...


In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the subjective mind, the mind of an individual; the objective mind, the mind of society and of the State; and the Absolute mind, a unity of all concepts. See also Hegel's Philosophy of Mind from his Encyclopedia.[63] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (IPA: ) (August 27, 1770 – November 14, 1831) was a German philosopher and, with Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, one of the representatives of German idealism. ...


In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are Phenomenology and Existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see noema) and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences.[64] Existentialism, a school of thought founded upon the work of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences. Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (April 8, 1859 – April 26, 1938) was a German philosopher, known as the father of phenomenology. ... The noema (plural: noemata) is the mental equivalent of a schema. ... Existentialism is the philosophical movement positing that individual human beings create the meaning and essence of their lives as persons. ... Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (IPA: , but usually Anglicized as ;  ) 5 May 1813 – 11 November 1855) was a prolific 19th century Danish philosopher and theologian. ... Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (October 15, 1844 – August 25, 1900) (IPA: ) was a nineteenth-century German philosopher. ...


An important, though not very well known, example of a philosopher of mind and cognitive scientist who tries to synthesize ideas from both traditions is Ron McClamrock. Borrowing from Herbert Simon and also influenced by the ideas of existential phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, McClamrock suggests that man's condition of being-in-the-world ("Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein") makes it impossible for him to understand himself by abstracting away from it and examining it as if it were a detached experimental object of which he himself is not an integral part.[65] Ron McClamrock is an associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, University at Albany. ... Herbert Alexander Simon (June 15, 1916 – February 9, 2001) was an American political scientist whose research ranged across the fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, public administration, economics, management, and philosophy of science and a professor, most notably, at Carnegie Mellon University. ... Existential phenomenology is a method of psychological observation based on the works of Martin Heidegger,Jean-Paul Sartre and W. Van Dusen. ... Maurice Merleau-Ponty (March 14, 1908 – May 4, 1961) was a French phenomenologist philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl. ... Martin Heidegger (September 26, 1889 – May 26, 1976) (IPA ) was a highly influential German philosopher. ...


Consequences of philosophy of mind

There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of death and its definitive character, the nature of emotion, of perception and of memory. Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.[1] For other uses, see Death (disambiguation), Dead (disambiguation), or Death (band). ... Look up Emotion in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. ... For other uses, see Memory (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Person (disambiguation). ... In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. ... Free-Will is a Japanese independent record label founded in 1986. ... In philosophy, the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic conciousness. ...


Free will

Main article: Free will

In the context of philosophy of mind, the problem of free will takes on renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.[1] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states, which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this reasoning a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[66] Free-Will is a Japanese independent record label founded in 1986. ... This article is about the general notion of determinism in philosophy. ...

Immanuel Kant rejected compatibilism
Immanuel Kant rejected compatibilism

This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if it had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.[66] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume.[67] More recently, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett,[68] and, from a dual-aspect perspective, by Max Velmans.[69] Image File history File linksMetadata Download high resolution version (550x730, 196 KB) Immanuel Kant Source - University of Texas Library Original source - Hundred Greatest Men, The. ... Image File history File linksMetadata Download high resolution version (550x730, 196 KB) Immanuel Kant Source - University of Texas Library Original source - Hundred Greatest Men, The. ... Kant redirects here. ... Compatibilism, also known as soft determinism and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. ... This article is about the philosopher. ... Daniel Clement Dennett (born March 28, 1942 in Boston, Massachusetts) is a prominent American philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. ... Max Velmans is a Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths College, University of London. ...


On the other hand, there are also many incompatibilists who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called libertarianism.[66] These philosophers affirm that the course of the world is not completely determined by natural laws: the will at least does not have to be and, therefore, it is potentially free. The most prominent incompatibilist in the history of philosophy was Immanuel Kant.[70] Critics of this position accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.[66] Compatibilism, also known as soft determinism and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. ... In philosophical debates about free will and determinism, libertarianism is generally held to be the combination of the following beliefs: that free will is incompatible with determinism that human beings do possess free will, and that determinism is false All libertarians subscribe to the philosophy of incompatibilism which states that... Kant redirects here. ...


The self

Main article: Self

The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self. If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, most modern philosophers of mind will affirm that no such thing exists.[71] The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, due to their physicalistic orientations, and due to a general acceptance among philosophers of the scepticism of the concept of 'self' by David Hume, who could never catch himself doing, thinking or feeling anything.[72] However, in the light of empirical results from developmental psychology, developmental biology and neuroscience, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus - an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections - seems reasonable.[73] The view of the self as an illusion is widely accepted by many philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett and Thomas Metzinger. Look up self in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... In philosophy, the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic conciousness. ... For other uses, see Soul (disambiguation). ... This article is about the philosopher. ... This article includes a list of works cited or a list of external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks in-text citations. ... Views of a Foetus in the Womb, Leonardo da Vinci, ca. ... Drawing of the cells in the chicken cerebellum by S. Ramón y Cajal Neuroscience is a field that is devoted to the scientific study of the nervous system. ... Daniel Clement Dennett (born March 28, 1942 in Boston, Massachusetts) is a prominent American philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. ... Thomas Metzinger (born March 12, 1958) is a German philosopher. ...


Notes and references

  1. ^ a b c d e f Kim, J. (1995). in Honderich, Ted: Problems in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  2. ^ a b Plato (1995). in E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, J.C.G. Strachan: Phaedo. Clarendon Press. 
  3. ^ a b Robinson, H. (1983): ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1, 123–44.
  4. ^ Nussbaum, M. C. (1984): ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 197–207.
  5. ^ Nussbaum, M. C. and Rorty, A. O. (1992): Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
  6. ^ a b Sri Swami Sivananda. Sankhya:Hindu philosophy: The Sankhya.
  7. ^ a b c d e f Descartes, René. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Hacket Publishing Company. ISBN 0-87220-421-9. 
  8. ^ a b c d e f Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in Samuel Guttenplan (org) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, 265-7.
  9. ^ a b Spinoza, Baruch (1670) Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (A Theologico-Political Treatise).
  10. ^ a b c d e Kim, J., "Mind-Body Problem", Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ted Honderich (ed.). Oxford:Oxford University Press. 1995.
  11. ^ Pinel, J. Psychobiology, (1990) Prentice Hall, Inc. ISBN 8815071741
  12. ^ LeDoux, J. (2002) The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York:Viking Penguin. ISBN 8870787958
  13. ^ Russell, S. and Norvig, P. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, New Jersey:Prentice Hall. ISBN 0131038052
  14. ^ Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene (1976) Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN
  15. ^ a b c Churchland, Patricia (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain.. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-03116-7. 
  16. ^ a b Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy: 67–90. 
  17. ^ a b c d Smart, J.J.C. (1956). "Sensations and Brain Processes". Philosophical Review. 
  18. ^ a b Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924627-0. 
  19. ^ a b c d Putnam, Hilary (1967). "Psychological Predicates", in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill, eds., Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
  20. ^ a b Dennett, Daniel (1998). The intentional stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-54053-3. 
  21. ^ a b Searle, John (2001). Intentionality. A Paper on the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt a. M.: Nachdr. Suhrkamp. ISBN 3-518-28556-4. 
  22. ^ a b c Jackson, F. (1982) “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Reprinted in Chalmers, David ed. :2002. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
  23. ^ a b c Nagel, T. (1974.). "What is it like to be a bat?". Philosophical Review (83): 435–456. 
  24. ^ Popper, Karl and Eccles, John (2002). The Self and Its Brain. Springer Verlag. ISBN 3-492-21096-1. 
  25. ^ Dennett D., (1991), Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown & Company
  26. ^ Stich, S., (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Bradford)
  27. ^ Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble
  28. ^ Agassi, J. (1997). La Scienza in Divenire. Rome: Armando. 
  29. ^ a b Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). Dualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved on 2006-09-25.
  30. ^ Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm [1714]. Monadology. 
  31. ^ Schmaltz, Tad (2002). Nicolas Malebranche. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved on 2006-09-25.

The Discourse on the Method is a philosophical and mathematical treatise published by René Descartes in 1637. ... This article is about the treatise published by Baruch Spinoza. ... Year 2003 (MMIII) was a common year starting on Wednesday of the Gregorian calendar. ... is the 231st day of the year (232nd in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ... Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ... is the 268th day of the year (269th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ... The Monadology (Monadologie, 1714) is one of Gottfried Leibniz’s works that best define his philosophy, monadism. ... Year 2006 (MMVI) was a common year starting on Sunday of the Gregorian calendar. ... is the 268th day of the year (269th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ...

Further reading

Richard McKay Rorty (October 4, 1931 in New York City – June 8, 2007) was an American philosopher. ... Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) is a famous and controversial work by American philosopher Richard Rorty. ... Alfred North Whitehead, OM (February 15, 1861, Ramsgate, Kent, England – December 30, 1947, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.) was an English-born mathematician who became a philosopher. ... Edwin Arthur Burtt (1892-1989) was an American philosopher, who wrote extensively on the philosophy of religion. ... Herbert Feigl (December 14, 1902 - June 1, 1988) was an Austrian philosopher and a member of the Vienna Circle. ... Celia Green. ... Causality or causation denotes the relationship between one event (called cause) and another event (called effect) which is the consequence (result) of the first. ... Gregory Bateson (9 May 1904–4 July 1980) was a British anthropologist, social scientist, linguist and cyberneticist whose work intersected that of many other fields. ...

See also

Kant redirects here. ... · Franz Brentano Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Brentano (January 16, 1838 Marienberg am Rhein (near Boppard) - March 17, 1917 Zürich) was an influential figure in both philosophy and psychology. ...

External links


  Results from FactBites:
 
Philosophy of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (1863 words)
Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind.
There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.
The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self.
Dualism (philosophy of mind) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (5401 words)
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.
We first encounter similar ideas in Western philosophy with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who maintained, for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.
Consequently, in order for the intellect (the most important aspect of the mind in philosophy up until Descartes) to have access to any kind of knowledge with regard to any aspect of the universe, it must necessarily be a non-physical, immaterial entity (or property of some such entity) itself.
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