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Encyclopedia > Personal identity (philosophy)

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns many numbers of loosely related issues, in particular persistence, change, time, and sameness. Personal identity is the distinct personality of an individual and is concerned with the persisting entity particular to a given individual. The personal identity structure appears to preserve itself from the previous version in time when it is modified. It is the individual characteristics arising from personality by which a person is recognized or known. John Locke considered personal identity (or the self) to be founded on consciousness, and not on the substance of either the soul or the body. For other uses, see Philosophy (disambiguation). ... Persistence is the term used in computer science to describe a capability used by a computer programmer to store data structures in non-volatile storage such as a file system or a relational database. ... This article does not cite any references or sources. ... Look up time in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... It has been suggested that Identity and change be merged into this article or section. ... For other persons named John Locke, see John Locke (disambiguation). ... In philosophy, the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic conciousness. ... Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and ones environment. ... Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is distinct from its properties. ... For other uses, see Soul (disambiguation). ... For other uses, see Body (disambiguation). ...

Contents

Description

Personal identity over time: What does it take for individuals to persist from moment to moment — or in other words, for the same individual to exist at different moments?

The question regarding personal identity has addressed the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time, known as personal continuity. This sort of analysis of personal identity provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. In the modern philosophy of mind, this concept of personal identity is sometimes referred to as the diachronic problem of personal identity. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. Image File history File links Download high resolution version (800x697, 123 KB) fr:: Montre gousset cs:: Kapesní hodinky de: Deutsch: Taschenuhr en: English: Pocket watch it: Italiano: Orologio da taschino (cipolla) es: Español: Reloj de bolsillo Template:ગુજરાતી ગુજરાતી: ખિસ્સામાં રાખવાની ઘડિયાળ ja: 日本語: 懐中時計 pl: Polski: Zegarek kieszonkowy pt: Português: Relógio de bolso... Image File history File links Download high resolution version (800x697, 123 KB) fr:: Montre gousset cs:: Kapesní hodinky de: Deutsch: Taschenuhr en: English: Pocket watch it: Italiano: Orologio da taschino (cipolla) es: Español: Reloj de bolsillo Template:ગુજરાતી ગુજરાતી: ખિસ્સામાં રાખવાની ઘડિયાળ ja: 日本語: 懐中時計 pl: Polski: Zegarek kieszonkowy pt: Português: Relógio de bolso... For other uses, see Person (disambiguation). ... A phrenological mapping of the brain. ...


The mind-body problem

The mind-body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship, if any, that exists between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes. One of the aims of philosophers who work in this area is to explain how a supposedly non-material mind can influence a material body and vice-versa. For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ...


Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states; ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move their body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain said pizza. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of grey matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. A related problem is to explain how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) can cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the correct manner. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of René Descartes. Stimulation is the irritating action of various agents (stimuli) on muscles, nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which activity is evoked; especially, the nervous impulse produced by various agents on nerves, or a sensory end organ, by which the part connected with the nerve is thrown into a state... The human eye is the first element of a sensory system: in this case, vision, for the visual system. ... A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. ... Drawing by Santiago Ramón y Cajal of neurons in the pigeon cerebellum. ... Theory of knowledge redirects here: for other uses, see theory of knowledge (disambiguation) According to Plato, knowledge is a subset of that which is both true and believed Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, methods, limitations, and validity of knowledge and belief. ... Descartes redirects here. ...


Consciousness basis

John Locke's chapter XXVII "On Identity and Diversity" in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualization of consciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself, through which moral responsibility could be attributed to the subject - and therefore punishment and guilt justified, as would critics such as Nietzsche point out. For other persons named John Locke, see John Locke (disambiguation). ... An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is one of John Lockes two most famous works, the other being his Second Treatise on Civil Government. ... In philosophy, the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic conciousness. ... Look up responsibility in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... Subject (philosophy) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia /**/ @import /skins-1. ... “Guilty” redirects here. ... Friedrich Nietzsche, 1882 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (October 15, 1844 - August 25, 1900) was a highly influential German philosopher. ...


According to Locke, personal identity (the self) "depends on consciousness, not on substance" nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this "thought" which doubles all thoughts, then personal identity is only founded on the repeated act of consciousness: "This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but... in the identity of consciousness". For example, one may claim to be a reincarnation of Plato, therefore having the same soul substance. However, one would be the same person as Plato only if one had the same consciousness of Plato's thoughts and actions that he himself did. Therefore, self-identity is not based on the soul. One soul may have various personalities. Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is distinct from its properties. ... For other uses, see Soul (disambiguation). ... This article is about the theological concept. ... For other uses, see Person (disambiguation). ...


Neither is self-identity founded on the body substance, argues Locke, as the body may change while the person remains the same. Even the identity of animals is not founded on their body: "animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance", as the body of the animal grows and change during its life. On the other hand, identity of humans is based on their consciousness. Take for example a prince's mind which enters the body of a cobbler: to all exterior eyes, the cobbler would remain a cobbler. But to the prince himself, the cobbler would be himself, as he would be conscious of the prince's thoughts and acts, and not those of the cobbler. A prince's consciousness in a cobbler's body: thus the cobbler is, in fact, a prince.


But this interesting border-case leads to this problematic thought that since personal identity is based on consciousness, and that only oneself can be aware of his consciousness, exterior human judges may never know if they really are judging - and punishing - the same person, or simply the same body. In other words, Locke argues that you may be judged only for the acts of your body, as this is what is apparent to all but God; however, you are in truth only responsible for the acts for which you are conscious. This forms the basis of the insanity defense: one can't be held accountable for acts from which one was unconscious - and therefore leads to interesting philosophical questions: Look up responsibility in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... In criminal trials, the insanity defenses are possible defenses by excuse, by which defendants argue that they should not be held criminally liable for breaking the law, as they were legally insane at the time of the commission of alleged crimes. ... Unconsciousness is the absence of consciousness. ...

"personal identity consists [not in the identity of substance] but in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrate and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrate waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen."

Or again:

"PERSON, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belong only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, --whereby it becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and plain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or APPROPRIATE to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in it than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For, supposing a MAN punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment and being CREATED miserable? And therefore, conformable to this, the apostle tells us, that, at the great day, when every one shall 'receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.' The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all person shall have, that THEY THEMSELVES, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the SAME that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them."

Henceforth, Locke's conception of personal identity founds it not on the substance or the body, but in the "same continued consciousness", which is also distinct from the soul since the soul may have no consciousness of itself (as in reincarnation). He creates a third term between the soul and the body - and Locke's thought may certainly be meditated by those who, following a scientist ideology, would identify too quickly the brain to consciousness. For the brain, as the body and as any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same. Therefore personal identity is not in the brain, but in consciousness. However, Locke's theory also reveals his debt to theology and to Apocalyptic "great day", which by advance excuse any failings of human justice and therefore humanity's miserable state. The problem of personal identity is at the center of discussions about life after death, and immortality. In order to exist after death, there has to be a person after death who is the same person as the person who died. This article is about the theological concept. ... This article is about the profession. ... Theology finds its scholars pursuing the understanding of and providing reasoned discourse of religion, spirituality and God or the gods. ... Look up Apocalypse in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... This article is about living for infinite period of time. ...


The bundle theory of the self

David Hume undertook looking at the mind/body problem (and Mind/brain identity). Hume' also investigated a person's character, the relationship between human and animal nature, and the nature of agency. Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same person we were five years ago. Though we've changed in many respects, the same person appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies that there is a distinction between the various features of a person and the mysterious self that supposedly bears those features. When we start introspecting, "we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement".[1] This article is about the philosopher. ... A phrenological mapping of the brain. ... Mind/brain or mind/body is in reference to Cartesian (Rene Descartes) philosophy which denotes the two main qualities of a person. ...


It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.[2]


Note in particular that, in Hume's view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. (Note that in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume said mysteriously that he was dissatisfied with his account of the self, yet he never returned to the issue.)


In short, what matters for Hume is not that 'identity' exist but that the relations of causation, contiguity, and resemblances obtain among the perceptions.


Personal continuity

In psychology (which historically is philosophically concerned with dualism), personal continuity, also called personal persistence, is the uninterrupted connection concerning a particular person of his or her private life and personality. Personal continuity is the union affecting the facets arising from personality in order to avoid discontinuities from one moment of time to another time. Psychological science redirects here. ... René Descartes illustration of dualism. ... The private sphere is the complement or opposite of the public sphere. ... Personality psychology is a branch of psychology which studies personality and individual differences. ... In mathematics, a continuous function is a function in which arbitrarily small changes in the input produce arbitrarily small changes in the output. ... Look up time in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ...


Personal continuity is an important part of identity; this is the process of ensuring that the quality of the mind are consistent from moment to the next, generally regarded to comprise qualities such as self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment. Personal continuity is the property of a continuous and connected period of time and is intimately concerned with a person's body or physical being. Associationism, or the method of how ideas combine in the mind, allows events or views to be associated with each other in the mind, thus leading to a form of learning. Associations can result from contiguity, similarity, or contrast. Through contiguity, one associates ideas or events that usually happen to occur at the same time. Some of these events form an autobiographical memory in which each is a personal representation of the general or specific events and personal facts. The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is identical to the brain. ... For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ... Moment refers to either of two related concepts in mathematics and physics: Moment (physics) Moment (mathematics) See also Moment (magazine), a Jewish general publication. ... It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with Self-consciousness. ... Not to be confused with sapience. ... Not to be confused with sentience. ... In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. ... In the philosophy of mind, associationism began as a theory about how ideas combine in the mind. ... This article or section does not cite any references or sources. ... Look up similarity in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... Look up Contrast in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ... This article needs to be wikified. ...


Ego identity

Main article: Id, ego, and super-ego

Ego integrity is the ego's accumulated assurance of its capacity for order and meaning. Ego identity is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others, as evidenced in the promise of a career. Body and ego must be masters of organ modes and of the other nuclear conflicts in order to face the fear of ego loss in situations which call for self-abandon. For other uses of ego and id, see EGO and ID. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it. ... For other uses of ego and id, see EGO and ID. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it. ... // Order may refer to: Religious Holy Orders, the rite or sacrament in which clergy are ordained The monastic orders, originating with Anthony the Great and Benedict of Nursia from circa 300 the military orders of the crusades the various chivalric orders established since the 14th century Honors Order (decoration) Legal... This article is about virtue. ... It has been suggested that Identity and change be merged into this article or section. ...


Criticisms and other analysis

Eric Olson gives a definition of a human as biological organisms and asserts that a psychological relation are not necessary for continuity. Olson's personal identity lies in life-sustaining processes instead of bodily continuity. Olson's biological approach squares with many other psychological accounts of personal identity but does not fall into common metaphysical traps.


Other criticisms state that the intuitive concept of self is an evolutionary artifact. In the monkey-riding-a-tiger model of consciousness the brain models its own unconscious processes just as it models other people. This modeling makes the assumption that the model will continue to apply through time, and so assumes they are the same person they were yesterday. This leads to the intuitive sense of self. The sense of ‘self’ has also become part of our language, part of our concept of responsibility, and the basis of self based morality. Free will is the philosophical doctrine that holds that our choices are ultimately up to us. ...


The sense of self is an evolutionary artifact, which saves time in the circumstances it evolved for. But sense of self breaks down when considering some rare events such as memory loss, split personality disorder, brain damage, brainwashing, and various thought experiments [3]. When presented with these imperfections in the intuitive sense of self and the consequences to important concept which rely partly on the strict concept of self, people tend to try to mend the concept possibly because of cognitive dissonance. This leads to extending the concept of self beyond it practical application and justification. [4] Cognitive dissonance is a psychological term describing the uncomfortable tension that may result from having two conflicting thoughts at the same time, or from engaging in behavior that conflicts with ones beliefs, or from experiencing apparently conflicting phenomena. ...


See also

Identity
Abstract objects, Personal life, Self (philosophy), Identity and change, Mind/brain identity, Ship of Theseus (about identity of things generally, not only of persons)
Continuity
consciousness, dependent origination, introspect, mnemonic, percept, perdurantism, synchronicity, noumena
People
Gottlob Frege, Derek Parfit, Anthony Quinton, David Wiggins, Sydney Shoemaker, Bernard Williams, Peter van Inwagen, Carl Jung, Erik Erikson, Hugo Münsterberg, Wilhelm Wundt, Dogen (being and time)
Other
Metaphysical necessity, Personally identifiable information, Privacy, Cerebrum, Brainy, Hemispherectomy, immaterialism, personhood

For other uses, see Abstract It is a commonplace in philosophy that every thing or object is either abstract or concrete. ... Personal life (or everyday life or human existence) is an individual humans personal, private career (including, but not the same as, their employment career), and is a common notion in modern existence -- although more so in more prosperous parts of the world, such as Western Europe and North America... In philosophy, the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic conciousness. ... The relationship between identity and change in the philosophical field of metaphysics seems, at first glance, deceptively simple, and belies the complexity of the issues involved. ... Mind/brain or mind/body is in reference to Cartesian (Rene Descartes) philosophy which denotes the two main qualities of a person. ... The Ship of Theseus is a paradox also known as Theseus paradox. ... Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and ones environment. ... Dependent Origination (Sanskrit: pratītya-samutpāda, Pali: paticca samuppada) The doctrine of pratitya-samutpada is Buddhisms primary contribution to metaphysics. ... This article is about the psychological process of introspecting. ... For other uses, see Mnemonic (disambiguation). ... The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject matter. ... Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity. ... Synchronicity is the experience of two or more events which occur in a meaningful manner, but which are causally inexplicable to the person or persons experiencing them. ... Noumena is a melodic death metal band from Finland. ... Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (8 November 1848, Wismar – 26 July 1925, IPA: ) was a German mathematician who became a logician and philosopher. ... Derek Parfit (born December 11, 1942) is a British philosopher who specializes in problems of personal identity, rationality and ethics, and the relations between them. ... --72. ... David Wiggins (born 8 March 1933) is a British moral philosopher, metaphysician, and philosophical logician working especially on identity. ... Sydney Shoemaker (born 1931) is a Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University. ... Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (September 21, 1929 – June 10, 2003) was a British philosopher, widely cited as the most important British moral philosopher of his time. ... Peter van Inwagen is John Cardinal OHara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. ... Jung redirects here. ... This article needs additional references or sources for verification. ... Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) was a German-born American]] psychologist. ... Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (August 16, 1832-August 31, 1920) was a German psychologist, physiologist, and professor who is, along with William James, regarded as the father of psychology. ... Dōgen Zenji Dōgen Zenji (道元禅師; also Dōgen Kigen 道元希玄, or Eihei Dōgen 永平道元, or Koso Joyo Daishi) (19 January 1200 – 22 September 1253) was a Japanese Zen Buddhist teacher born in Kyōto, and the founder of the Sōtō school of Zen in Japan. ... Modal logic, or (less commonly) intensional logic is the branch of logic that deals with sentences that are qualified by modalities such as can, could, might, may, must, possibly, and necessarily, and others. ... In information security and privacy, personally identifiable information or personally identifying information (PII) is any piece of information which can potentially be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person. ... Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to control the flow of information about themselves and thereby reveal themselves selectively. ... The telencephalon (IPA: ) is the name for the forebrain, a large region within the brain to which many functions are attributed. ... Brainy is a character on Nickelodeons Hey Arnold!.A running gag in the series, he shows up out of nowhere usually when Helga is alone,pining for Arnold. ... Hemispherectomy is a medical procedure where one hemisphere (half) of the brain is removed. ... Immaterialism is the theory propounded by Bishop Berkeley in the 18th century which holds that there are no material objects, only minds and ideas in those minds. ... In colloquial English, person is often synonymous with human. ...

Notes

  1. ^ THN, I, IV, vi
  2. ^ A Treatise of Human Nature, 4.1, 2.
  3. ^ "Staying alive game - Examples of thought experiments on personal identity"
  4. ^ "Criticism of personal identity"

References

General information

  • Vere Claiborne Chappell, The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 343 pages. ISBN 0521387728
  • Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity. Routledge, 2003. 296 pages. ISBN 0415273153
  • Daniel Dennett, Where am I?
  • Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, part 3.
  • Bernard Williams, The Self and the Future, in Philosophical Review 79.
  • John Locke, Of Ideas of Identity and Diversity
  • E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics, chapters 2,3, 4.
  • J. Cim & E.Sosa, A Companion to Metaphysics. Page 380, "persons and personal identity".
  • Mark Siderits, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003. 231 pages. ISBN 0754634736
  • Marc Slors, The Diachronic Mind. Springer, 2001. 234 pages. ISBN 0792369785
  • Shaun Gallagher, Jonathan Shear, Models of the Self. Imprint Academic, 1999. 524 pages. ISBN 0907845096
  • E. Jonathan Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford University Press, 2001. 288 pages. ISBN 0199244995
  • Eric Todd Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press, 1997. 189 pages. ISBN 0195134230
  • John Perry, The problem of personal identity. 1975.
  • John Perry, ed. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Thomas Reid, Of identity. Of Mr. Locke's account of our personal identity. In Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Reprinted in Perry, ed. 1975.
  • J. Butler, Of personal identity. In J. Angus, ed. The Analogy of Religion. London.
  • G Kopf, Beyond Personal Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self. Routledge, 2001. ISBN 0700712178
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  • Brian Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge, 1998. 137 pages. ISBN 0415165733
  • E.J Lowe, An Introduction to Philosophy of the Mind. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Daniel Clement Dennett (born March 28, 1942 in Boston, Massachusetts) is a prominent American philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. ... Derek Parfit (born December 11, 1942) is a British philosopher who specializes in problems of personal identity, rationality and ethics, and the relations between them. ... This article or section should include material from Derek Parfit Reasons and Persons (ISBN 019824908X) is a philosophical work by Derek Parfit. ... Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (September 21, 1929 – June 10, 2003) was a British philosopher, widely cited as the most important British moral philosopher of his time. ... For other persons named John Locke, see John Locke (disambiguation). ... A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (ISBN 0-915144-53-0) is a book by the philosopher John Perry. ...

Articles and publications

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  • N Agar, Functionalism and Personal Identity. Nous, 2003.
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  • Andrew Brennan, Personal identity and personal survival. Analysis, 42, 44-50. 1982.
  • Lloyd Fields, Parfit on personal identity and desert. Phil Quarterly, 37, 432-441. 1987.
  • Brian Garrett, Personal identity and extrinsicness. Mind, 97, 105-109. 1990.
  • Derek Parfit, Personal identity. Philosophical Review, 80, no.1, 3-27. 1971.
  • John Robinson, Personal identity and survival. Journal of Philosophy, 85, 319-328. 1988.
  • E J Borowski, Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity. The Philosophical Quarterly, 1975.
  • R W Perrett, C Barton, Personal Identity, Reductionism and the Necessity of Origins. Erkenntnis, 1999.
  • B Williams, Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity. Analysis, 1960.
  • B Romero, Self-maintenance therapy in Alzheimer's disease. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 2001.
  • BM Ross, Remembering the Personal Past: Descriptions of Autobiographical Memory. Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN 0195068947
  • D Mohr, Development of attributes of personal identity. Developmental Psychology, 1978.
  • DG Thompson, The Religious Sentiments of the Human Mind. 1888.
  • DJ Kroger, Identity Development: Adolescence Through Adulthood. Sage Publications Inc., 2006. 303 pages. ISBN 0761929606
  • G Foulds, Personal continuity and psycho-pathological disruption. PMID 14197795
  • GF Hellden, Personal Context and Continuity of Human Thought: Recurrent Themes in a Longitudinal Study of Students' Conceptions.
  • MJ Chandler, JE Marcia, B Publishers, Personal Persistence, Identity Development, and Suicide. Blackwell Publishing, 2003. ISBN 1405118792
  • J Copner,The Faith of a Realist. Williams and Norgate, 1890. 351 pages.
  • J Habermas, The paradigm shift in Mead. In M. Aboulafia (Ed.), Philosophy, social theory, and the thought of George Herbert Mead 1991. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
  • J Jacobson, Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity Among British Pakistani Youth. Routledge, 1998. 177 pages. ISBN 0415170850
  • J Sully, Illusions: A Psychological Study. Appleton, 1881. 372 pages.
  • JC LaVoie, Ego identity formation in middle adolescence. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 1976.
  • JM Shorter, More About Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity. Analysis, 1962.
  • S Seligman, RS Shanok, Subjectivity, Complexity and the Social World. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 1995.
  • SD Bozinovski, Self-Neglect Among the Elderly: Maintaining Continuity of Self. DIANE Publishing, 1998. 434 pages. ISBN 0788174568
  • W Greve, K Rothermund, D Wentura, The Adaptive Self: Personal Continuity and Intentional Self-development. 2005.
  • WE Conn, Erikson’s “identity”: an essay on the psychological foundations of religious ethics.

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