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Encyclopedia > Dualism (philosophy of mind)
René Descartes' illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the epiphysis in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit.

In philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[1] Image File history File links Download high resolution version (493x609, 68 KB) Summary A larger version of [1] Licensing Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1. ... Image File history File links Download high resolution version (493x609, 68 KB) Summary A larger version of [1] Licensing Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1. ... René Descartes (French IPA: ) (March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Renatus Cartesius (latinized form), was a highly influential French philosopher, mathematician, scientist, and writer. ... The pineal gland (also called the pineal body or epiphysis) is a small endocrine gland in the brain. ... A Phrenological mapping of the brain. ... For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ... A Non-physical entity is an entity that lacks a physical or material body or material or physical characteristics. ...


Ideas on mind/body dualism originate at least as far back as Plato and Aristotle and deal with speculations as to the existence of an incorporeal soul which bore the faculties of intelligence and wisdom. Plato and Aristotle maintained, for different reasons, that people's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body.[2][3] The soul, according to many religious and philosophical traditions, is the self-aware essence unique to a particular living being. ... PLATO was one of the first generalized Computer assisted instruction systems, originally built by the University of Illinois (U of I) and later taken over by Control Data Corporation (CDC), who provided the machines it ran on. ... Aristotle (Greek: Aristotélēs) (384 BC – 322 BC) was a Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. ...


A generally well known version of dualism is attributed to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. Hence, he was the first to formulate the mind-body problem in the form in which it exists today.[4] Dualism is contrasted with various kinds of monism, including physicalism and phenomenalism. Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism and thus would only be contrasted with non-emergent materialism.[5] This article discusses the various forms of dualism and the arguments which have been made both for and against this thesis. René Descartes (French IPA: ) (March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Renatus Cartesius (latinized form), was a highly influential French philosopher, mathematician, scientist, and writer. ... To meet Wikipedias quality standards, this article may require cleanup. ... The Monad was a symbol referred by the Greek philosophers as The First, The Seed, The Essence, The Builder, and The Foundation Monism is the metaphysical and theological view that all is one, that there are no fundamental divisions, and a unified set of laws underlie nature. ... The term physicalism was coined by Otto Neurath, in a series of early 20th century essays on the subject, in which he wrote According to physicalism, the language of physics is the universal language of science and, consequently, any knowledge can be brought back to the statements on the physical... In epistemology and the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (e. ... In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions. ... Property dualism is a philosophy of mind, and a subbranch of emergent materialism. ... Emergent materialism asserts that we will never understand the mechanism of emergence: it will always seem to us like emergence is magical. ... Emergent materialism asserts that we will never understand the mechanism of emergence: it will always seem to us like emergence is magical. ...

Contents

Historical overview

Plato and Aristotle

In the dialogue Phaedo, Plato formulated his famous Theory of Forms as distinct and immaterial substances of which the objects and other phenomena that we perceive in the world are nothing more than mere shadows.[2] Plato's doctrine was the prototype of all future manifestations of substance dualism in ontology. But Plato's doctrine of the Forms is not to be considered some sort of ancient and superseded metaphysical notion because it has precise implications for the philosophy of mind and the mind-body problem in particular. It has been suggested that Phaidon be merged into this article or section. ... PLATO was one of the first generalized Computer assisted instruction systems, originally built by the University of Illinois (U of I) and later taken over by Control Data Corporation (CDC), who provided the machines it ran on. ... Theory of Forms typically refers to Platos belief that the material world as it seems to us is not the real world, but only a shadow of the real world. ... // In philosophy, ontology (from the Greek , genitive : of being (part. ... Plato (Left) and Aristotle (right), by Raphael (Stanza della Segnatura, Rome) Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the ultimate nature of reality, being, and the world. ... A Phrenological mapping of the brain. ...


Plato makes it clear, in the Phaedo, that the Forms are the universalia ante rem, i.e. they are universal concepts (or ideas) which make all of the phenomenal world intelligible. Consequently, in order for the intellect (the most important aspect of the mind in philosophy up until Descartes) to have access to any kind of knowledge with regard to any aspect of the universe, it must necessarily be a non-physical, immaterial entity (or property of some such entity) itself. So, it is clear on the basis of the texts that Plato was a very powerful precursor of Descartes and his subsequent more stringent formulation of the doctrine of substance dualism.[2] For other uses, see Mind (disambiguation). ... René Descartes (French IPA: ) (March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Renatus Cartesius (latinized form), was a highly influential French philosopher, mathematician, scientist, and writer. ...


Aristotle strongly rejected Plato's notion of Forms as independently existing entities. In the Metaphysics, he already points to the central problems with this idea.[3] On the one hand, if we say that the particulars of the phenomenal world participate or share in the Form, we seem to be destroying the Form's essential and indispensable unity. However, if we say that the particulars merely resemble, or are copies of, the Form, we seem to need an extra form to explain the connection between the members of the class consisting of the-particulars-and-the-form, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. This argument, originally formulated by Plato himself in the Parmenides, was later given the name of the "third man argument" by Aristotle.[3] Aristotle (Greek: Aristotélēs) (384 BC – 322 BC) was a Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. ... Metaphysics is one of the principal works of Aristotle and the first major work of the branch of philosophy with the same name. ... Parmenides is one of the dialogues of Plato. ... The Third Man Argument (commonly refered to as TMA), first offered by Plato in his dialogue Parmenides, is a philosophical criticism of Platos own Theory of Forms. ...


For these reasons, Aristotle revised the theory of forms so as to eliminate the idea of their independent existence from concrete, particular entities.[6] The form of something, for Aristotle, is the nature or essence (ousia, in Greek) of that thing. To say that Socrates and Callias are both men is not to say that there is some transcendent entity "man" to which both Socrates and Callias belong. The form is indeed substance but it is not substance over and above the substance of the concrete entities which it characterizes. Aristotle rejects both universalia in rebus as well as universalia ante rem.[6] Some philosophers and thinkers have taken this to be a form of materialism and there may be something to their arguments. However, what is important from the perspective of philosophy of mind is that Aristotle does not believe that intellect can be conceived of as something material. He argues as follows: if the intellect were material then it could not receive all of the forms. If the intellect were a specific material organ (or part of one) then it would be restricted to receiving only certain kinds of information, as the eye is restricted to receiving visual data and the ear is restricted to receiving auditory data. Since the intellect is capable of receiving and reflecting on all forms of data, then it must not be a physical organ and, hence, it must be immaterial.[6] This article does not cite any references or sources. ... In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions. ...


From Neoplatonism to Scholasticism

Early Christianity seems to have struggled to come to terms with the identification of a unique position with regard to the question of the relationship between mind and body, just as it struggled to define the relationship of the ontological status of Christ himself (see homoousianism, homoiousianism, Arianism, etc). In the early Middle Ages, a consensus seemed to emerge around what is now called Neoplatonism. The doctrines of Neoplatonism were essentially minor modifications on Plato's general ideas about the immortality of the soul and the nature of the Forms. The Neoplatonic Christians identified the Forms with souls and believed that the soul was the substance of each individual human being, while the body was just a shadow or copy of these eternal phenomena.[7] // In philosophy, ontology (from the Greek , genitive : of being (part. ... Topics in Christianity Movements · Denominations Ecumenism · Preaching · Prayer Music · Liturgy · Calendar Symbols · Art · Criticism Important figures Apostle Paul · Church Fathers Constantine · Athanasius · Augustine Anselm · Aquinas · Palamas · Wycliffe Tyndale · Luther · Calvin · Wesley Arius · Marcion of Sinope Pope · Archbishop of Canterbury Patriarch of Constantinople Christianity Portal This box:      Christ is the English... Homoousianism (from the Greek ομολοζ meaning same and ousia meaning essence or being) is the offical doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to the ontological status of the three parts of the Trinity: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. ... Homoiousianism (from the Greek ομολοζ κατˈοισιαυ) was a 4th century ACE movement which arose in the early period of the Christian religion out of a wing of Arianism. ... This article is about theological views like those of Arius. ... Neoplatonism (also Neo-Platonism) is the modern term for a school of philosophy that took shape in the 3rd century AD, based on the teachings of Plato and earlier Platonists. ...


Later philosophers, following in the neo-Aristotelian trail blazed by Thomas Aquinas, came to develop a trinitarian notion of forms which paralleled the Trinitarian doctrine of Father, Son and Holy Spirit: forms, intellect and soul were three aspects or parts of the same singular phenomenon. For Aquinas, the soul (or intellect) remained the substance of the human being, but, somewhat similarly to Aristotle's proposal, it was only through its manifestation inside the human body that a person could be said to be a person. While the soul (intellect or form) could exist independently of the body the soul by itself did not constitute a person. Hence, Aquinas suggested that instead of saying "St. Peter pray for us" one should rather say something like "soul of St. Peter pray for us", since all that remained of St. Peter, after his death, was his soul. All things connected with the body, such as personal memories, were cancelled out with the end of one's corporeal existence.[8] Saint Thomas Aquinas (also Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino; c. ... Trinitarianism is the Christian doctrine that God, although one being, exists in three distinct persons (hypostases) known collectively as the Holy Trinity. ...


There are different views on this question in modern Christianity. Official Catholic Church doctrine, as illustrated by the Apostle's Creed, claims that at the Second Coming of Christ, the body is reunited with the soul at the resurrection, and the whole person (i.e. body and soul) then goes to Heaven or Hell. Hence, there is a sort of inseparability of soul, mind and body which is even more strongly reminiscent of Aristotle than the positions expressed by Thomas Aquinas.[9] The Apostles Creed is an early statement of Christian belief, probably from the first or second century. ... This article does not cite any references or sources. ... “The Inferno” redirects here. ...


Some revisionist Protestant theologians do not accept this doctrine and insist, instead, that only the immaterial soul (and hence mind or intellect) goes to Heaven, leaving the body (and brain) behind it forever.[10] This article does not cite any references or sources. ...


Still other Christians, including Seventh-day Adventists, teach that the soul, if it exists at all, does not survive death, citing biblical claims that the dead know nothing, and that a person's thoughts perish with them when they die. According to this view, death is like a sleep - consciousness is lost at death, but is restored to the resurrected body at the resurrection. The concept of a soul as distinct from the body would therefore be redundant.[citation needed] The Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDA), colloquially referred to as the Adventists, is an evangelical Protestant Christian denomination that grew out of the prophetic Millerite movement in the United States during the middle part of the 19th century. ...


Descartes and his disciples

In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes embarked upon a quest in which he called all his previous beliefs into doubt, in order to find out what he could be certain of.[4] In doing so, he discovered that he could doubt whether he had a body (it could be that he was dreaming of it or that it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he could not doubt whether he had a mind. This gave Descartes his first inkling that the mind and body were different things. The mind, according to Descartes, was a "thinking thing" (lat. res cogitans), and an immaterial substance. This "thing" was the essence of himself, that which doubts, believes, hopes, and thinks. The distinction between mind and body is argued in Meditation VI as follows: I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create. So, Descartes argues, the mind, a thinking thing, can exist apart from its extended body. And therefore, the mind is a substance distinct from the body, a substance whose essence is thought.[4] The title page of the Meditations Meditations on First Philosophy (subtitled In which the existence of God and the real distinction of mind and body, are demonstrated) is a philosophical treatise written by René Descartes first published in Latin in 1641 . ... René Descartes (French IPA: ) (March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Renatus Cartesius (latinized form), was a highly influential French philosopher, mathematician, scientist, and writer. ... Look up substance in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ...


The central claim of what is often called Cartesian dualism, in honor of Descartes, is that the immaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally interact. This is an idea which continues to feature prominently in many non-European philosophies. Mental events cause physical events, and vice-versa. But this leads to a substantial problem for Cartesian dualism: How can an immaterial mind cause anything in a material body, and vice-versa? This has often been called the "problem of interactionism". // In philosophy, ontology (from the Greek , genitive : of being (part. ...


Descartes himself struggled to come up with a feasible answer to this problem. In his letter to Elisabeth of Bohemia, Princess Palatine, he suggested that animal spirits interacted with the body through the pineal gland, a small gland in the centre of the brain, between the two hemispheres.[4] The term "Cartesian dualism" is also often associated with this more specific notion of causal interaction through the pineal gland. However, this explanation was not satisfactory: how can an immaterial mind interact with the physical pineal gland? Because Descartes's was such a difficult theory to defend, some of his disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, proposed a different explanation: That all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. According to these philosophers, the appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. These occasionalists maintained the strong thesis that all causation was directly dependent on God, instead of holding that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body.[11] For other people with the same name, see Elisabeth of Bohemia. ... The pineal gland (also called the pineal body or epiphysis) is a small endocrine gland in the brain. ... Italic text // ahh addiing sum spiice iin hurr`` For other uses, see Brain (disambiguation). ... Human brain viewed from above, showing cerebral hemispheres. ... Arnold Geulincx (January 31, 1624 - November 1669), Flemish philosopher and logician. ... Nicolas Malebranche (August 6, 1638 – October 13, 1715) was a French philosopher of the Cartesian school. ... This article discusses the term God in the context of monotheism and henotheism. ... Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that neither matter nor mind can be a true cause of events. ...


Types of mind-body dualism

Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types:

(1) Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances.[1]
(2) Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism).[1]
(3) Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.[1]

In philosophy, emergentism is the belief in emergence, particularly as it involves consciousness and the philosophy of mind, and as it contrasts with reductionism. ...

Substance dualism

Substance dualism is a type of dualism most famously defended by Descartes, which states that there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material.[5] The mental does not have extension in space, and the material cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mind-body problem.[12] Substance dualism is a philosophical position compatible with most theologies which claim that immortal souls occupy an independent "realm" of existence distinct from that of the physical world.[1] David Chalmers recently developed a thought experiment inspired by the movie The Matrix in which substance dualism could be true: Consider a computer simulation in which the bodies of the creatures are controlled by their minds and the minds remain strictly external to the simulation. The creatures can do all the science they want in the world, but they will never be able to figure out where their minds are, for they do not exist in their observable universe. This is a case of substance dualism with respect to computer simulation. This naturally differs from a computer simulation in which the minds are part of the simulation. In such a case, substance monism would be true.[13] René Descartes René Descartes (IPA: , March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Cartesius, worked as a philosopher and mathematician. ... Theology finds its scholars pursuing the understanding of and providing reasoned discourse of religion, spirituality and God or the gods. ... David John Chalmers (born April 20, 1966) is a philosopher in the area of philosophy of mind. ... In philosophy, physics, and other fields, a thought experiment (from the German Gedankenexperiment) is an attempt to solve a problem using the power of human imagination. ... The Matrix is a 1999 science fiction action film written and directed by Larry and Andy Wachowski and starring Keanu Reeves, Laurence Fishburne, Carrie-Anne Moss, Joe Pantoliano and Hugo Weaving. ... The Monad was a symbol referred by the Greek philosophers as The First, The Seed, The Essence, The Builder, and The Foundation Monism is the metaphysical and theological view that all is one, that there are no fundamental divisions, and a unified set of laws underlie nature. ...


Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism. Different versions of property dualism describe this in different ways. Epiphenomenalism asserts that while material causes give rise to sensations, volitions, ideas, etc., such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. Interactionism, on the other hand, allows that mental causes can produce material effects, and vice-versa.[14] Emergent materialism asserts that we will never understand the mechanism of emergence: it will always seem to us like emergence is magical. ... Epiphenomenalism is a view in philosophy of mind according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world. ... It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with Sensation and perception psychology. ... Volition is the study of will, choice, and decision. ... IDEA may refer to: Electronic Directory of the European Institutions IDEA League Improvement and Development Agency Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Indian Distance Education Association Integrated Data Environments Australia Intelligent Database Environment for Advanced Applications IntelliJ IDEA - a Java IDE Interactive Database for Energy-efficient Architecture International IDEA (International Institute... Interactionism is a generic sociological perspective that brings under its umbrella a number of subperspectives: phenomenology ethnomethodology Symbolic interactionism (social psychology) Interactionism is an American sociological current that analyzes the social interaction. ...


What views properly fall under the property dualism rubric is itself a matter of dispute. John Searle is the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls biological naturalism. His view is that although mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality). Since causal irreducibility is what counts in arguments over interactionism, Searle must be considered an opponent of such views. He believes the mental will ultimately be explained through neuroscience. John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and is noted for contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and consciousness, on the characteristics of socially constructed versus physical realities, and on practical reason. ... Biological Naturalism states that consciousness is a higher level function of the human brains physical capabilities. ... // In philosophy, ontology (from the Greek , genitive : of being (part. ... It has been suggested that this article be split into multiple articles accessible from a disambiguation page. ...


Does this make him a "property dualist"? He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike. But he thinks the comparison is misleading.[15]


Predicate dualism

Predicate dualism is the view espoused by most non-reductive physicalists, such as Donald Davidson and Jerry Fodor, who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages.[16][17] If we characterize predicate monism as the view subscribed to by eliminative materialists, who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, desire, think, feel, etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist, then predicate dualism is most easily defined as the negation of this position. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology", with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining and understanding human mental states and behavior. Donald Davidson (March 6, 1917 – August 30, 2003) was an American philosopher and the Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. ... Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is a philosopher at Rutgers University, New Jersey. ... Eliminativists argue that our modern belief in the existence of mental phenomena is analogous to our ancient belief in obsolete theories such as the geocentric model of the universe. ... A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. ...


Davidson, for example, subscribes to Anomalous Monism, according to which there can be no strict psycho-physical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It is in terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like relations with other physical events. Mental predicates are irreducibly different in character (rational, holistic and necessary) from physical predicates (contingent, atomic and causal).[16] Anomalous Monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind-body relationship. ...


Dualist views of mental causation

Three varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of the interactions.

Image File history File links Dualism. ... Image File history File links Dualism. ...

Interactionism

Interactionism is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states. This is a position which is very appealing to common-sense intuitions, notwithstanding the fact that it is very difficult to establish its validity or correctness by way of logical argumentation or empirical proof. It seems to appeal to common-sense because we are surrounded by such everyday occurrences as a child's touching a hot stove (physical event) which causes him to feel pain (mental event) and then yell and scream (physical event) which causes his parents to experience a sensation of fear and protectiveness (mental event) and so on.[5] Logic, from Classical Greek λόγος logos (meaning word, account, reason or principle), is the study of the principles and criteria of valid inference and demonstration. ...


Epiphenomenalism

Main article: Epiphenomenalism

According to epiphenomenalism, all mental events are caused by a physical event and have no physical consequences. So, the mental event of deciding to pick up a rock ("M") is caused by the firing of specific neurons in the brain ("P"). When the arm and hand move to pick up the rock ("E") this is not caused by the preceding mental event M, nor by M and P together, but only by P. The physical causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics, and therefore mental causes are eliminated using this reductionist explanation. If P causes both M and E, there is no overdetermination in the explanation for E.[5] Epiphenomenalism is a view in philosophy of mind according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world. ... Reductionism in philosophy describes a number of related, contentious theories that hold, very roughly, that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (explained by) simpler or more fundamental things. ... Overdetermination, the idea that a single observed effect is determined by multiple causes at once (any one of which alone might be enough to account for the effect), was originally a key concept of Sigmund Freuds psychoanalysis. ...


Parallelism

Psycho-physical parallelism is a very unusual view about the interaction between mental and physical events which was most prominently, and perhaps only truly, advocated by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. Like Malebranche and others before him, Leibniz recognized the weaknesses of Descartes' account of causal interaction taking place in a physical location in the brain. Malebranche decided that such a material basis of interaction between material and immaterial was impossible and therefore formulated his doctrine of occasionalism, stating that the interactions were really caused by the intervention of God on each individual occasion. Leibniz's idea is that God has created a pre-established harmony such that it only seems as if physical and mental events cause, and are caused by, one another. In reality, mental causes only have mental effects and physical causes only have physical effects. Hence the term parallelism is used to describe this view.[14] It has been suggested that this article be split into multiple articles. ... Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that neither matter nor mind can be a true cause of events. ... Gottfried Leibnizs theory of pre-established harmony is a philosophical theory about causation under which every substance only affects itself, but all the substances (both bodies and minds) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other because they have been programmed by God in advance to...


Occasionalism

Main article: Occasionalism

Occasionalism is a philosophical doctrine about causation which says that created substances cannot be efficient causes of events. Instead, all events are taken to be caused directly by God himself. The theory states that the illusion of efficient causation between mundane events arises out of a constant conjunction that God had instituted, such that every instance where the cause is present will constitute an "occasion" for the effect to occur as an expression of the aforementioned power. This "occasioning" relation, however, falls short of efficient causation. In this view, it is not the case that the first event causes God to cause the second event: rather, God first caused one and then caused the other, but chose to regulate such behaviour in accordance with general laws of nature. Some of its most prominent historical exponents have been Louis de la Forge, Arnold Geulincx, and Nicholas Malebranche.[11] Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that neither matter nor mind can be a true cause of events. ... Arnold Geulincx (January 31, 1624 - November 1669), Flemish philosopher and logician. ... Nicolas Malebranche (August 6, 1638 – October 13, 1715) was a French philosopher of the Cartesian school. ...


Arguments for dualism

Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a pore in the ventricle (F) allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of the leg, causing the foot to withdraw.

Image File history File links 230px-pineal. ... Image File history File links 230px-pineal. ...

Subjective argument in support of dualism

A very important argument against physicalism (and hence in favor of some sort of dualism) consists in the idea that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties.


Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events obviously do not. So, for example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like.[18]


Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia (or raw feels). There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[1] Redness is the canonical quale. ...


Thomas Nagel, himself a physicalist, first characterized the problem of qualia for physicalistic monism in his article, "What is it like to be a bat?". Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-person, scientific perspective about a bats sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to be a bat. Thomas Nagel (born July 4, 1937, in Belgrade, Serbia) is University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University and member of the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. ... The term physicalism was coined by Otto Neurath, in a series of early 20th century essays on the subject, in which he wrote According to physicalism, the language of physics is the universal language of science and, consequently, any knowledge can be brought back to the statements on the physical...


Frank Jackson formulated his famous knowledge argument based upon similar considerations. In this thought experiment, he asks us to consider a neuroscientist, Mary, who was born, and has lived all of her life, in a black and white room with a black and white television and computer monitor where she collects all the scientific data she possibly can on the nature of colours. Jackson asserts that as soon as Mary leaves the room, she will come to have new knowledge which she did not possess before: the knowledge of the experience of colours (i.e., what they are like). Although, by hypothesis, Mary had already known everything there is to know about colours from an objective, third-person perspective, she never knew, according to Jackson, what it was like to see red, orange, or green. Frank Cameron Jackson (born 1943) is a professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. ... In philosophy, physics, and other fields, a thought experiment (from the German Gedankenexperiment) is an attempt to solve a problem using the power of human imagination. ...


If Mary really learns something new, it must be knowledge of something non-physical, since she already knew everything there is to know about the physical aspects of colour.[19] David Lewis' response to this argument, now known as the ability argument, is that what Mary really came to know was simply the ability to recognize and identify color sensations to which she had previously not been exposed.[20] This argument fails because it confuses knowing how to do something with knowing something as something. Others have taken Lewis argument and attempted to modify it to argue that the ability that is learned consists in some sort of process of imagining or remembering. David Kellogg Lewis (September 28, 1941 – October 14, 2001) is considered to have been one of the leading analytic philosophers of the latter half of the 20th century. ...


Special sciences argument

This argument says that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are special sciences which are irreducible to physics. These irreducible special sciences, which are the source of allegedly irreducible predicates, presumably differ from the hard sciences in that they are interest-relative. If they are interest-relative, then they must be dependent on the existence of minds which are capable of having interested perspectives. Psychology is, of course, the paragon of special sciences; therefore, it and its predicates must depend even more profoundly on the existence of the mental.


Physics, at least ideally, sets out to tell us how the world is in itself, to carve up the world at its joints and describe it to us without the interference of individual perspectives or personal interests. On the other hand, such things as the patterns of the weather seen in meteorology or the behavior of human beings are only of interest to human beings as such. The point is that having a perspective on the world is a psychological state. Therefore, the special sciences presuppose the existence of minds which can have these states. If one is to avoid ontological dualism, then the mind that has a perspective must be part of the physical reality to which it applies its perspective. If this is the case, then in order to perceive the physical world as psychological, the mind must have a perspective on the physical. This, in turn, presupposes the existence of mind.[14]


The zombie argument

The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers. The basic idea is that one can imagine and therefore conceive the existence of one's body without any conscious states being associated with it. A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, sentience, or sapience. ... In philosophy, physics, and other fields, a thought experiment (from the German Gedankenexperiment) is an attempt to solve a problem using the power of human imagination. ... David John Chalmers (born April 20, 1966) is a philosopher in the area of philosophy of mind. ...


Chalmers' argument is that it seems very plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe about a zombie must be true of it. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one.[21]


Argument from personal identity

This argument concerns the differences between the applicability of counterfactual conditionals to physical objects, on the one hand, and to conscious, personal agents on the other.[22] In the case of any material object, e.g. a printer, we can formulate a series of counterfactuals in the following manner: A counterfactual conditional (sometimes called a subjunctive conditional) is a logical conditional statement whose antecedent is (ordinarily) taken to be contrary to fact by those who utter it. ...

  1. This printer could have been made of straw.
  2. This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube transistors.
  3. This printer could have been made of 95% of what it is actually made of and 5% vacuum-tube transistors, etc..

Somewhere along the way from the printer's being made up exactly of the parts and materials which actually constitute it to the printer's being made up of some different matter at, say, 20%, the question of whether this printer is the same printer becomes a matter of arbitrary convention.


Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a slightly genetically modified sperm. Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity of Frederick. In this latter case, it has been claimed, overlap of constitution cannot be applied to the identity of mind. As Madell puts it:

"But while my present body can thus have its partial counterpart in some possible world, my present consciousness cannot. Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either is or is not mine. There is no question of degree here."[22]

If the counterpart of Frederick, Frederickus, is 70% constituted of the same physical substance as Frederick, does this mean that it is also 70% mentally identical with Frederick. Does it make sense to say that something is mentally 70% Frederick?[23]


Arguments against dualism

Argument from causal interaction

Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice-versa have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material. This is the basic problem of causal interaction. It can be broken down into three parts.


First, it is not clear where the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's fingers causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that lead to one's brain, to something happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally resulting in the sensation of pain. But pain is not supposed to be spatially localizable. It might be responded that the pain "takes place in the brain." But, intuitively, pains are not located anywhere.


This may not be a devastating criticism. However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of how the interaction takes place. It may be supposed that this is solely a matter for science to resolve -- scientists will eventually discover the connection between mental and physical events. But philosophers also have something to say about the matter, since the very notion of a mechanism which explains the connection between the mental and the physical would be very strange, at best. For example, compare such a mechanism to a mechanism that is well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. What happens in this case is that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a certain velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket. Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause any neuron to fire. The puzzle is to explain how something without any physical properties could have any physical effects at all.


Some philosophers have replied to this, as follows: there is indeed a mystery about how the interaction between mental and physical events can occur. But the fact that there is a mystery does not mean that there is no interaction. Plainly there is an interaction and plainly the interaction is between two totally different sorts of events. The problem with this response is that it does not seem to answer the full power of the objection.


The objection can be formulated more precisely. When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a physical event, which ultimately results in his walking across the room. The problem is that if we have something totally nonphysical causing a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is no physical event which causes the firing. That means that some physical energy seems to have appeared out of thin air. Even if one maintains that the decision has some sort of mental energy, and that the decision causes the firing, there is still no explanation of where the physical energy for the firing came from. It just seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.[24]


Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy mentions two possible replies to this objection.[5] The first reply says that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. Another possibility is to deny that human body is closed system. Since the principle of conservation of energy applies only to closed systems, the objection becomes irelevant. Catholic Encyclopedia mentions the same replies, along with some others.[25]


Conservation of energy and causal closure

One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism, as pointed out above, is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to understand how two completely different types of substances (material and immaterial) are able to interact causally. One response to this is to point out that, perhaps, the causal interaction that takes place is not at all of the classical "billiard ball" type of Newtonian mechanics but instead involves energy, dark matter or some other such mysterious processes.[14] It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with Classical mechanics. ...


Even if the latter is true, it has been argued, there is still a problem: such interactions seem to violate the fundamental laws of physics. If some external and unknown source of energy is responsible for the interactions, for example, then this would violate the law of the conservation of energy.[26] On the other hand, the conservation laws only apply to closed and isolated systems and since human beings are not closed and isolated systems, an interactionist would argue, then the laws of conservation absolutely do not apply in this case. This article or section is in need of attention from an expert on the subject. ... Conservation of energy states that the total amount of energy in an isolated system remains constant, although it may change forms (for instance, friction turns kinetic energy into thermal energy). ...


Along the same lines, some argue against dualistic interactionism that it violates a general heuristic principle of science: the causal closure of the physical world. But Mills has responded to this by pointing out that mental events may be causally overdetermined. Causal overdetermination means that some features of an effect may not be fully explained by its sufficient cause. For example, "the high pitched music caused the glass to break but this is the third time that that glass has broken in the last week." It is certain that the high-pitched music is the sufficient cause of the breaking of the glass, but it does not explain the feature of the event that is identified by the phrase "this is the third time this week...". That feature is causally related, in some sense, to the two prior events of the glasses having broken in the last week. In response, it has been pointed out that we should probably focus on the inherent or intrinsic features of situations or events, if they exist, and apply the idea of causal closure to just those specific features. Look up Heuristic in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. ...


Moreover, there is the question of determinism versus indeterminism. In quantum mechanisms, events at the microscopic level (at least) are indeterminate. The more precisely I can localize the position of an electron, the more imprecise becomes my ability to determine its angular momentum and vice-versa. Philosophers such as Karl Popper and John Eccles have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply even at the macroscopic scale.[27] Most scientists, however, insist that the effects of such indeterminacy cancel each other out at larger levels. Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition and behavior, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. ... In physics, a quantum (plural: quanta) is an indivisible entity of energy. ... e- redirects here. ... Sir Karl Raimund Popper, CH, FRS, FBA, (July 28, 1902 – September 17, 1994), was an Austrian born naturalized British[1] philosopher and a professor at the London School of Economics. ... Sir John Carew Eccles (January 27, 1903 – May 2, 1997) was an Australian neurophysiologist who won the 1963 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on the synapse. ...


Argument from brain damage

This argument has been formulated by Paul Churchland, among others. The point is simply that when the brain undergoes some kind of damage (caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse or pathological diseases), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.[28] Paul Churchland (born 1942) is a philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego. ...


A famous case that can help illustrate such an example is that of Phineas Gage, who was struck in the face with a projectile iron pole, carving a hole into his frontal lobe. This, however, did not kill him, he died some twelve years later of natural causes. However, what the accident did do was change Gage's mind set and his personality. Thus, one may say that the accident clearly caused the change of the mental state. Thus, a material action, the accident and destruction of the brain, which is essentially the body, caused for a change in the mind, which hence shows a clear correlation between the two. Thus, When Descartes suggests that the mind is unaffected by the body's actions, he is refuted by such medical facts. Phineas Gages death mask Phineas P. Gage (1823 – May 21, 1860) was a railroad construction foreman who suffered a traumatic brain injury when a tamping iron accidentally passed through his skull, damaging the frontal lobes of his brain. ...


Dualists sometimes may separate the brain from the body and join it in a different case, as vaguely described by Descartes as that of a third class, a sort of linking class. This class links the mind and the body, so that the mind may influence the body, as well as perceive changes to the body as the brain delivers and processes information. In Descartes' analogy to the sailor and his ship, the alert that something is wrong with the ship serves the same function as the brain. Though the alert is not the mind nor body, it can be changed or altered to affect the mind's reaction to the body's stimuli. Thus, through the brain, or through the damaged brain, the mind may persist separately and a different entity from the body. Such is a view that can also be viewed as Triism, or the view that divides into three parts.


Argument from biological development

Another common argument against dualism consists in the idea that since human beings (both phylogenetically and ontogenetically) begin their existence as entirely physical or material entities and since nothing outside of the domain of the physical is added later on in the course of development, then we must necessarily end up being fully developed material beings. Phylogenetically, the human species evolved, as did all other species, from a single cell made up of matter. Since all the events that later occurred which ended up in the formation of our species can be explained through the processes of random mutation and natural selection, the difficulty for the dualist is to explain where and why there could have intervened some non-material, non-physical event in this process of natural evolution. Ontogenetically, we begin life as a simple fertilized ovum. There is nothing non-material or mentalistic involved in conception, the formation of the blastula, the gastrula, and so on. Our development can be explained entirely in terms of the accumulation of matter through the processes of nutrition. The postulation of a non-physical mind would seem superfluous. A phylogeny (or phylogenesis) is the origin and evolution of a set of organisms, usually of a species. ... Ontogeny (also ontogenesis or morphogenesis) describes the origin and the development of an organism from the fertilized egg to its mature form. ... A human ovum Sperm cells attempting to fertilize an ovum An ovum (plural ova) is a haploid female reproductive cell or gamete. ... Blastulation. ... 1 - blastula, 2 - gastrula; orange - ectoderm, red - endoderm. ... The updated USDA food pyramid, published in 2005, is a general nutrition guide for recommended food consumption. ...


Argument from simplicity

The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction (see Occam's razor). This argument was criticized by Peter Glassen in a debate with J. J. C. Smart in the pages of Philosophy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[29] Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, Occam's Razor cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. William of Ockham Occams razor (sometimes spelled Ockhams razor) is a principle attributed to the 14th-century English logician and Franciscan friar William of Ockham. ... Peter Glassen (1920-1986) was a professor of philosophy at the University of Manitoba from 1949 until his death in 1986. ... John Jameison Carswell Smart, or Jack Smart, (born 1920, M.A. (Glasgow, 1946), B.Phil (Oxford, 1948)) is a Scottish-Australian philosopher. ...


Dualism in modern science

The error of dualism

Criticisms of dualism have been very successful in modern science, and few if any neuroscientists would consider taking such a position. Scientists commonly assume that only the physical, and thus measurable, is real. Mental states and processes are viewed as biological states and processes. Nevertheless, there remains a practice, invisible but widespread in the social and biological sciences, in which a logic of dualism persists, and where an assumption of dualism can be demonstrated. This error is illustrated in the following example from Richard DeGrandpre, which appeared in 1999 in The Sciences: This article does not cite any references or sources. ... The Sciences was published from 1993 to 2000 by the New York Academy of Sciences. ...

In 1971 the neurologist Mary Coleman... reported the levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in blood samples from twenty-five hyperactive children, none of whom were receiving drug treatment at the time of the study. Coleman compared those serotonin levels with levels from a larger sample of children who showed no hyperactivity. As she had expected, even the children with the lowest serotonin levels in the control group had higher levels of serotonin than all but two of the children in the hyperactive group. Thus one could distinguish hyperactive from nonhyperactive children through a biochemical measure alone, almost without error.
Are those results evidence that ADHD is a biological disorder? Within the framework of Cartesian dualism, in which mind and body are treated as distinct entities, the answer is yes. The reason is that for biological reductionists, mental or psychological states are denied any causal efficacy - indeed, the question arises how mind and body could, even in principle, interact at all. Thus for the dualist a correlation between behavior and biochemistry is immediately treated as evidence that hyperactivity is an entirely biological, and probably inherited, problem. No messy, multiply determined psychological states need ever be invoked at all. And that, as it happens, is precisely what most contemporary students of ADHD suggest.[30]

DeGrandpre's point is that the failure to consider that both the hyperactivity and the biochemical measure might both result from experience and environment reflects an underlying and unexamined assumption of dualism. The scientific monist, he argues, would assume that all psychological and behavioral expressions have a physiological substructure, and thus would not fail to consider a causal link between biological measures and past environmental events. His point is advanced, as follows:

What is particularly intriguing about Coleman's study is that she resisted the assumption that the physiological correlate was necessarily the basis of the behavior. What would happen to serotonin and hyperactivity levels, she asked, if the life circumstances of the children were to change? Coleman arranged for the two most hyperactive children to spend a few additional weeks in the hospital setting -- and away from the usual conditions of their lives. By the end of their stays, the children's abnormally low serotonin levels had nearly returned to normal, and their hyperactivity had lessened considerably. Moreover, one boy's attention span increased from thirty seconds to ten minutes, and the other boy's lengthened from three minutes to fifteen minutes. Interestingly (albeit unfortunately), a month after the boys left the hospital, their serotonin and hyperactivity had both returned to the earlier, problematic levels.[30]

The results of this particular experiment illustrate the fundamental error of what DeGrandpre has dubbed "the new scientific dualism", as it runs roughshod over the basic scientific principle of cause and effect.


Another example may clarify this error. Psychiatric drugs typically consist of molecules that bind to specific receptors in the brain and either block or enhance the actions of certain brain chemicals, altering neuronal pathways. This fact had led to a common claim in medicine that mental disorders are biological, since biological agents produce a reduction of symptoms. Critics, on the other hand, have argued that non-medication-based approaches such as psychotherapy, exercise, or relaxation can also alter brain pathways. For instance, studies have demonstrated that placebo effects can reduce depressive systems by producing biological changes in the brain.


While these arguments differ on issues of mind, brain, and behavior, they nevertheless each reflect a strain of the error of dualism. As in the hyperactivity example above, the first shows the error of assuming that any correlation between a brain change and a behavior is evidence that the latter has a biological basis. The second also makes an error, albeit a more subtle one, in suggesting that there is something surprising in the finding that experience and environment alter brain biochemistry. If all but the vestiges of dualism have been swept from modern biological science, why is it not a prevailing and reflexive assumption that all psychological and social phenomenon have a biological impact on, and/or expression within, the brain. To suggest they do not is to adopt the scientific dualism of mind as causal and yet also immaterial.


The function of dualism in modern science

If neuroscientists have adopted materialism over dualism, why does dualism persist in modern biological science? One possible explanation involves other underlying assumptions and biases regarding causality in the brain sciences. As DeGrandpre points out, In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions. ...

As technological advances have offered a closer look at the brain's connection to human thought and action, they have also enabled biological psychiatrists and neuroscientists to promote a dangerous institutional bias toward neurological reductionism. Spurred by funding from multimillion-dollar pharmaceutical companies and by the cultural penchant for quick fixes, such investigators frequently exploit the intellectual naivete of the media and the public by implying that any simple physiological correlate of behavior is good evidence of cause. Thus they mislead the public into accepting the view that all human psychopathology is, at its roots, a biological pathology - instead of explicitly acknowledging that mind, brain and behavior share irreducible interconnections.[30]

The suggestion here is that much of the general public operates on an assumption of mind and body as two different kinds, which is exploited by brain scientists. If the public reflexively believes that the psychological realm is distinct from the biological realm, then any correlation shown between brain and behavior can be identified as a causation between brain and behavior.


Criticisms of such causal claims have been leveled elsewhere. An editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry in May 1999 asked whether functional magnetic resonance imaging (or fMRI) is twenty-first century phrenology. The piece notes, "Neuroimaging offers a powerful probe of brain state, but we are now faced with metaphysical questions; i.e., what is a brain state, and how is it related to the outward manifestations of behavior? This has the potential for degenerating into the old mind-body duality of Descartes..." kkdkd ... Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is the use of MRI to measure the haemodynamic response related to neural activity in the brain or spinal cord of humans or other animals. ... A 19th century Phrenology chart. ...


Similarly, Sandra Blakeslee points out in the New York Times that "just because a brain area is correlated with a behavior in F.M.R.I. studies does not mean that it causes the behavior... Imaging studies often make this mistake" (March 14, 2000). The New York Times is an internationally known daily newspaper published in New York City and distributed in the United States and many other nations worldwide. ...


As noted above, there is a growing body of evidence showing the direct impact of environment and experience on the brain, and this is undermining scientist's ability to exploit dualistic tendencies in popular culture. Nevertheless, the fact that such a tearing-down process has been necessary with the rise of modern neuroscience suggests the degree to which a latent mind-body dualism persists, even in the 21st century.


References

  1. ^ a b c d e f Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 265-7.
  2. ^ a b c Plato (390s-347 BC) Platonis Opera, vol. 1, Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson and J.C.G. Strachan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
  3. ^ a b c Aristotle (c. mid 4th century BC) Metaphysics (Metaphysica), ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924, 2 vols; Books IV-VI, trans. C.A. Kirwan, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971; Books VII-VIII trans. D. Bostock, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Books XIII-XIV trans. J. Annas, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
  4. ^ a b c d Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 1-62.
  5. ^ a b c d e Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/dualism/.
  6. ^ a b c Aristotle (c. mid 4th century BC) On the Soul (De anima), ed. R.D. Hicks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907; Books II-III trans. D.W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
  7. ^ Whittaker (1901) The Neo-Platonists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  8. ^ Aquinas, Thomas (1266-71) Summa Theologica. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2d, rev. ed., 22 vols., London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1912-36; reprinted in 5 vols., Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981.
  9. ^ Apostles' Creed. Catechism of the Catholic Church. Retrieved on June 21, 2005.
  10. ^ Spong, John Selby (1994) Resurrection: Myth or Reality, New York: HarperCollins Publishing. ISBN 0-06-067546-2.
  11. ^ a b Schmaltz, Tad, "Nicolas Malebranche", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/malebranche/
  12. ^ Crouch, William, "The philosophy of the mind: Dualism", http://www.onphilosophy.co.uk/dualism.html.
  13. ^ Chalmers, David, "The Matrix as Metaphysics", http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html, Note 6.
  14. ^ a b c d Robinson, H. (2003) "Dualism", in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 85-101.
  15. ^ Searle, John (1983) "Why I Am Not a Property Dualist", http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc.
  16. ^ a b Donald Davidson (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924627-0.
  17. ^ Fodor, Jerry (1968) Psychological Explanation, Random House. ISBN 0-07-021412-3.
  18. ^ Nagel, Thomas (1986) The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press.
  19. ^ Jackson, Frank (1977) Perception: A Representative Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  20. ^ Lewis, David (1988) "What Experience Teaches", in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 262-290.
  21. ^ Chalmers, David (1997). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-511789-1. 
  22. ^ a b Madell, G. (1981) The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
  23. ^ Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R. (1984) Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.
  24. ^ Baker, Gordon and Morris, Katherine J. (1996) Descartes' Dualism, London: Routledge.
  25. ^ Maher, Michael (1909) "The Law of Conservation of Energy", Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5, pp. 422 ff, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05422a.htm.
  26. ^ Lycan, William (1996) "Philosophy of Mind" in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, ed. Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
  27. ^ Popper, Karl R. and Eccles, John C. (1977) The Self and Its Brain, Berlin: Springer.
  28. ^ Churchland, Paul (1988) Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  29. ^ Glassen, Peter (1976) "J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor", Philosophy 51, pp. 349-352; J. J. C. Smart (1978) "Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing?", Philosophy 53, pp. 382-385; Peter Glassen (1983) "Smart, Materialism and Believing", Philosophy 58, pp. 95-101.
  30. ^ a b c DeGrandpre, R.J. (March/April 1999) "Just Cause? Many neuroscientists are all too quick to call a blip on a brain scan the reason for a behavior", The Sciences, pp. 14-18, http://www.nyas.org/publications/sciences/pdf/ts_03_99.pdf.

is the 172nd day of the year (173rd in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. ... Year 2005 (MMV) was a common year starting on Saturday (link displays full calendar) of the Gregorian calendar. ...

Further reading

  • Wikibooks: Consciousness Studies
  • Bracken, Patrick, and Thomas, Philip (December 21, 2002) "Time to move beyond the mind-body split", editorial, British Medical Journal 325, pp. 1433-1434. A controversial perspective on the use and possible overuse of the Mind-Body split and its application in medical practice.

The British Medical Journal (BMJ) is a medical journal published weekly in the United Kingdom by the British Medical Association (BMA)which published its first issue in 1845. ...

See also

  • Mind-body dichotomy
  • Sacred-profane dichotomy

René Descartes illustration of mind/body dualism. ... The dichotomy between the sacred and the profane has been identified by French sociologist Emile Durkheim as the central characteristic of religion: religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden. ...

External links


  Results from FactBites:
 
Dualism (philosophy of mind) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (5229 words)
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.
We first encounter similar ideas in Western philosophy with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who maintained, for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.
Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism and thus would only be contrasted with non-emergent materialism.
Philosophy of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (5699 words)
Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the exact nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness, and of whether these have a relationship with the physical body: the so-called "mind–body problem."
Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, while property dualists maintain that the mind is a jumble of independent properties that emerge from the brain and cannot be reduced to it, but that it is not a distinct substance.
Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.
  More results at FactBites »

 
 

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